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THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE REGULATION 
OF CUSTOM 
Darrell A.H. Miller* 
Custom is an underdeveloped concept in Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence. While a substantial body of work has explored the tech-
nical meaning of custom as it applies to § 1983 and, to a lesser extent, 
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, few scholars 
have offered sustained treatment of custom as a way to understand the 
meaning and scope of the Thirteenth Amendment. This gap exists de-
spite the fact that Congress specifically identified custom as a subject of 
regulation when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and despite the 
fact that the Thirteenth Amendment operates directly on the behavior of 
private parties. The fact that the Thirteenth Amendment can be applied 
to custom has important implications for how the Amendment should be 
construed. In particular, the concept of custom—especially as it relates 
to practices that upheld the slave system in the South—helps give shape 
and content to the other undefined terms the Thirteenth Amendment has 
generated: the “badges,” “incidents,” and “relics” of slavery. Ultimately, 
the concept of custom can help guide policymakers and judges who must 
consider the scope, the limitations, and the continuing relevance of the 
Thirteenth Amendment in the twenty-first century. 
INTRODUCTION 
Custom is an underdeveloped concept in Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence. While a substantial body of work explores custom as a 
term of art in § 19831 and, to a lesser extent, Congress’s power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment,2 few scholars have examined custom as a 
way to understand the meaning and scope of the Thirteenth 
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1. E.g., Susan Bandes, Monnell, Paratt, Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom 
or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 101, 104 (1986) (discussing 
distinction between random acts and government customs under § 1983); Myriam E. 
Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal 
Liability, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 17, 49–50 (2000) (discussing failure of contemporary jurispru-
dence to adequately take into account custom in civil rights enforcement under § 1983).  
2. E.g., George Rutherglen, Custom and Usage as Action Under Color of State Law: 
An Essay on the Forgotten Terms of Section 1983, 89 Va. L. Rev. 925, 927 (2003) [herein-
after Rutherglen, Custom and Usage] (discussing role of custom in understanding 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and its relationship to Fourteenth Amendment).  
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Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment power to regulate custom re-
mains undertheorized despite the fact that Congress specifically identi-
fied custom as an object of regulation in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,3 
and despite the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment operates directly on 
the behavior of private parties, unmediated by the requirements of either 
state action or interstate commerce.4 
Scholars frequently mention that the Thirteenth Amendment is de-
signed to eradicate slavery’s customs.5 Their otherwise excellent articles 
have tended to treat the Thirteenth Amendment’s effect on slavery’s cus-
toms as self-evident and indisputable. Accordingly, the task of exploring 
what constitutes a custom of slavery, who gets to decide when a custom is 
related to slavery, what limits discretion in defining a custom of slavery, 
the relationship between custom and existing Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and the legal basis for regulating custom at all, has largely 
been left to other authors.6  
This Essay is an effort to reckon with these issues. Its goal is not to 
revisit custom as a term of art in the Reconstruction Acts. Instead, it seeks 
to assess more broadly what it means for the Thirteenth Amendment 
power to be informed by custom, and how the concept of custom helps 
frame difficult issues concerning judicial and congressional power to 
construe and to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibitions.  
                                                 
3. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (declaring anyone, who, through 
custom, deprives another of rights protected by Act is guilty of a misdemeanor); accord 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 423 (1968) (“To the Congress that passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, it was clear that [the rights guaranteed under the Act] might be 
infringed not only by ‘State or local law’ but also by ‘custom, or prejudice.’” (quoting 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 129, 209 (1866)) .  
4. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (“[T]he Thirteenth 
Amendment extends beyond state action . . . .”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 
(1883) (recognizing power under Amendment to act “direct and primary” upon acts of 
individuals); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1367, 1370 (2008) [hereinafter Rutherglen, State Action] 
(remarking on Thirteenth Amendment’s unique applicability to private conduct). 
5. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1368 (1992) 
(“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment broke sharply with custom insofar as custom condoned 
the condition of slavery.”); Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1801, 1817 (2010) (“To enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress must disestablish 
all the institutions, practices, and customs associated with slavery and make sure they can 
never rise up again.”). 
6. One welcome exception in this regard is William Carter, who has discussed in 
more detail how custom interacts with the Thirteenth Amendment analysis. See William 
M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1311, 1365–79 (2007) (discussing custom, race, 
and badges and incidents of slavery). This Essay attempts to fit his insights on custom into 
a larger structural and theoretical framework describing the regulation of custom in gen-
eral, its historical provenance, and its potential in Thirteenth Amendment construction 
and enforcement.  
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This Essay concludes that custom—especially as it relates to practices 
that justified, maintained, and upheld the institution of slavery in 
America—can give shape and content to the other undefined terms that 
the Thirteenth Amendment has generated: the “badges,” “incidents,” 
and “relics” of slavery. This Essay posits that the Thirteenth Amendment 
not only eradicated slavery as an unspoken customary norm around 
which the Constitution was built; it also equipped Congress with the 
power to participate in norm entrepreneurialism with respect to these 
customs.7 Through the Section 2 enforcement power, the Thirteenth 
Amendment gave Congress the authority to identify those behaviors that, 
individually or in the aggregate, have a colorable analog to either a his-
torical practice or a historic disability of slavery, and to create legislation 
to prevent or inhibit those behaviors from ripening into a recognized 
norm. 
The relationship between slavery, custom, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment has three key implications. First, it helps to rationalize terms 
like “badges,” “incidents,” and “relics” of slavery by linking them to a 
concept of custom and tradition that originated during the slave era. 
Second, it enables the public, through their elected representatives, to 
engage in a dialogue that the Reconstruction Congress began concern-
ing the meaning of slavery and freedom. Third, custom defines a gener-
ous—but not unlimited—set of historical and conceptual parameters in-
side which Congress can act. The result is a Thirteenth Amendment that 
is neither a historical curio nor a font of utopian idealism, but something 
measured, historically contextualized, and fully part of our republican 
experiment.  
This Essay progresses as follows. Part I offers a brief taxonomy of cus-
tom in Anglo-American culture and the relationship of custom to the 
institution of slavery: Part I.A discusses custom as a form of higher law, 
and explains how judges and slavery’s apologists used this concept of cus-
tom to justify the legality, and occasionally the morality, of slavery; Part 
I.B discusses custom as particular law and explains how custom operated 
in a more granular way to regulate the social, economic, and political 
interactions between slaves, free blacks, and whites; Part I.C departs from 
custom as a term of art in law and discusses, more generally, how custom 
in the looser sense of social norms helped maintain the slave system in 
America, especially after emancipation; and Part I.D offers a brief sum-
mary and analysis of slavery and custom. Part II then turns to the 
Thirteenth Amendment and its effect on custom in these three forms. 
Part II also addresses the role that courts and Congress play in regulating 
                                                 
7. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from 
the Legal Academy, in Social Norms 35, 44 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 
2001) (discussing concept and role of norm entrepreneurs); Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2031–33 (1996) (discussing how law 
and private norm entrepreneurs work together to change behavior). 
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the customs of slavery identified in Part I, and justifies the difference be-
tween their two roles. Part III then briefly discusses the practical and the-
oretical implications of viewing the Thirteenth Amendment power 
through the lens of custom.  
I. CUSTOM AS A SOCIO-LEGAL CONCEPT 
Custom is “a Rorschach blot.”8 Custom can mean the basic or funda-
mental law of a nation. Eighteenth-century writers used terms like the 
“common law,” the “common rights of Englishmen,”9 or the “common 
custom of England”10 to describe custom in this sense. Through the 
centuries, this type of custom has been associated with various kinds of 
authority: tradition, the wisdom of accumulated experience, the law of 
nations, and transcendental notions of reason, natural rights, and divine 
law.11 Custom in this sense largely predates positivist accounts of law.12 
Today, it is reflected in decisions holding that the U.S. Constitution con-
tains certain unexpressed but generally understood precepts of which 
the text is merely a reflection or confirmation. For example, a personal 
right to keep and bear arms,13 the sovereign immunity of states from suits 
brought by their own citizens,14 and a right to an abortion15 have all been 
justified on the basis of customary higher law not necessarily specified in 
the text.16  
                                                 
8. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960: The Crisis of 
Legal Orthodoxy 123 (1992). Horwitz used this image to describe the fact that conserva-
tive legal thinkers of the late nineteenth century invoked custom to avoid the perils of 
“natural rights individualism” and unchecked majoritarian legislation. Id. 
9. 1 Benjamin Franklin, William Temple Franklin & William Duane, Memoirs of 
Benjamin Franklin 214 (New York, Derby & Jackson 1859) (1818) (transcribing examina-
tion of Franklin before House of Commons in 1766).  
10. E.g., John Hawles, The Englishman’s Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister at 
Law and a Juryman 9 (London, Free-School, Gower’s Walk 1844) (1680). 
11. See James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and 
Reason?, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1321, 1323–27 (1991) (discussing muddled nature of how 
founding-era lawyers used word “custom”); see also infra Part I.A (examining custom as 
form of “higher law”). 
12. See Rutherglen, Custom and Usage, supra note 2, at 928 (“Custom was not always 
confined to such a derivative role. It used to be a source of law that public officials were 
required to recognize, which preexisted their official acts and survived afterward as well.”). 
But see Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 Yale 
L.J. 202, 229 (2010) (identifying Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion on legitimacy of slave 
trade in The Antelope, 23 (10 Wheat.) U.S. 66 (1825), as example of legal positivism).  
13. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591–92 (2008) (finding right to 
keep and bear arms for confrontation preexists constitutional text). 
14. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (discussing common law tradition of 
sovereign immunity from suit reflected in Eleventh Amendment). 
15. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (finding right to abortion is 
substantive due process right).  
16. For a sustained discussion of this idea, see generally Suzanna Sherry, The 
Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1156 (1987) [hereinafter 
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Custom can also refer to the practice and usage of certain localities, 
trades, or classes. At one time, this type of custom was earthy and demo-
cratic; it relied upon testimony and was submitted to jurors, with review 
by the judiciary. This more populist conception of custom grew frail 
through the Middle Ages until by the eighteenth century, it had shrunk 
to a brittle exception to the more general common law pronounced by 
judges.17 Nevertheless, custom in this particular sense still serves a resid-
ual function as a nontextual norm on which courts may rely to fill gaps or 
resolve ambiguities in the text of contracts, statutes, and other written 
instruments.18 
Custom may also mean a set of cultural or behavioral norms that are 
followed, but are not necessarily recognized as “legal” in the sense of hav-
ing acquired the formal imprimatur of government. Instead, these cus-
toms are enforced by social sanctions or rewarded with intangible bene-
fits like esteem and prestige.19 Custom in this sense may be internalized, 
so that it operates as a subliminal check, even without enforcement by 
third parties.20  
The unifying feature of custom in all these senses is that it originates 
in praxis and exists outside text. Its unwrittenness distinguishes it from 
the pronouncements of legislatures or monarchs. Custom can be 
acknowledged in texts, such as Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights.21 Cus-
tom can be recorded in the decisions of a judge or codified by legisla-
tion. But custom does not require text. Custom exists whether written or 
not.22  
                                                                                                                 
Sherry, Unwritten Constitution] (discussing Bill of Rights in particular as simply codifying 
certain fundamental natural law rights).  
17. See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1331–41 (discussing decline of local custom).  
18. See Riorden v. Clarke, 8 S.W.3d 182, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (permitting lower 
court to use custom and practice to interpret ambiguous statutory term “travel time”); 
Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete 
Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 389, 394 (noting Uniform Commercial Code “gives broad 
permission for courts to fill gaps by incorporating practices and unwritten customs” (citing 
U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1977))). 
19. Ellickson, supra note 7, at 35–36. Offering a seat on a train to a pregnant or el-
derly person might be one such example of a cultural or behavioral norm.  
20. Id. at 36 (discussing how internalized norms are self-enforcing); Richard M. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 340 
(1997) [hereinafter McAdams, Regulation of Norms] (referring to norms as “informal 
social regulations that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense 
of duty, . . . fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both”). 
21. See Frederic W. Maitland & Francis C. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal 
History 79 (James F. Colby ed., 1915) (observing Magna Carta’s “own theory of itself . . . is 
that the old law, which a lawless king has set at naught, is to be restored, defined, cove-
nanted, and written”); see also Hawles, supra note 10, at 8–9 (referring to customs as rei-
fied in Magna Carta).  
22. Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law 177 (1966) (“The [common law] 
principle can exist, without a writing, in the form of a generally accepted tradition.”); see 
also Kunal M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900, at 
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Slavery as an American institution relied upon custom in all three of 
these senses: Slavery was an institution justified as a species of general 
law; slavery was an institution recognized through localized practice, and 
used to fill textual or conceptual gaps; and slavery was an institution 
maintained by informal normative forces. The history and theory of these 
concepts—general custom, particular custom, and customary norms—do 
not lend themselves to clear demarcations, and the charged history of 
slavery complicates the story. Further, courts, legal theorists, and histori-
ans disagree over the relative roles custom played in this peculiar institu-
tion. But the complexity of custom’s role in the creation, maintenance, 
persistence, and abolition of slavery is not a good reason to abandon its 
exploration in favor of comfortable and uncritical positivism. Further, as 
this Essay will argue in Part III, no theory of the Thirteenth Amendment 
can be complete without engaging issues of slavery and custom at all 
three of these levels.23 
A. Custom as General or Higher Law 
Anglo-American law began as custom.24 As Sir John Davies wrote in 
the seventeenth century, “the Common Law of England is nothing else 
but the Common Custome of the Realm.”25 Custom to these early think-
ers required neither Parliament nor parchment; it was a “matter of fact” 
reflected in “use and practice.”26 If it could be said to be recorded any-
                                                                                                                 
38 (2011) (discussing distinction as expressed in Matthew Hale, History of the Common 
Law of England 2 (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1713)).  
23. As Professor Palmer writes, “[C]ustoms form part of the cultural-legal history of 
slavery and their study can provide insights into the theoretical relationship between law 
and extralegal norms and the nature of legal change.” Vernon Valentine Palmer, The 
Customs of Slavery: The War Without Arms, 48 Am. J. Legal Hist. 177, 178 (2006). 
24. See Charles Howard McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy 
42 (1910) (“Laws in feudal times are in the main declarations of existing custom; they are 
. . . ‘not enactments but records.’” (quoting Edward Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle 
Ages 61 (London, John Murray 1897))); James R. Stoner, Jr., The Idiom of Common Law 
in the Formation of Judicial Power, in The Supreme Court and American 
Constitutionalism 47, 50 (Bradford P. Wilson & Ken Masugi eds., 1998) (“Common law 
was, in the first place, the immemorial customary law of England . . . .”); see also R.H. 
Helmholz, Christopher St. German and the Law of Custom, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 132 
(2003) (“Custom [in medieval England] was not simply a ‘background norm.’ For many 
purposes it was treated as binding law.”). For criticism of this account, see J.W. Tubbs, The 
Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Modern Conceptions 1–2 (2000) (arguing medi-
eval evidence “is too mixed to establish custom as the only or even the primary way of con-
ceptualizing the common law”). 
25. John Davies, Preface Dedicatory to Les Reports des Cases & Matters en Ley, 
Resolves & Adjudges en les Courts del Roy en Ireland (John Davies ed.) (London, E. 
Flesher, J. Streater, & H. Twyford 1674) (emphasis omitted); see also Parker, supra note 
22, at 33–34 (drawing upon Davies and discussing law as “self-given,” as opposed to 
hierarchically imposed and inherited by all people).  
26. Davies, supra note 25.  
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where, it was recorded only “in the memory of the people.”27 For these 
reasons, early Western legal traditions treated custom as fundamental 
and foundational.28 Custom, to paraphrase James Whitman, constituted 
“the basic norm,” the bedrock, the anchor of all “legal reality.”29 Custom 
was justice.30  
Custom as raw aboriginal justice gradually become more formal-
ized.31 Juries replaced compurgators,32 and individual justice became sys-
tematized in the localities.33 But, as Professor Whitman has documented, 
determining custom suffered a “crisis of proof”34 as political and judicial 
authority became more centralized, the work of criminal and civil adju-
dication migrated from the localities to the King’s ministers, and legisla-
tures began to produce edicts that appeared more than mere summaries 
of the practices of the realm.35 
                                                 
27. Id.  
28. Whitman, supra note 11, at 1330 (“Custom formed the ‘basic norm,’ the 
fundamental source of legitimacy upon which ‘legal reality’ . . . was founded.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
29. Id. (using similar terms to describe Western European notions of custom). 
30. Id. (stating that to medieval jurists, “[w]hat was not customary, was not right”); cf. 
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality decision) (not-
ing that due process limitations of Fourteenth Amendment are determined by “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice” and looking to “pedigree” to determine what is 
just). 
31. See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 1 (2d ed. 1981) 
(describing early courts as “essentially community meetings”); see also Whitman, supra 
note 11, at 1330 (noting that customs could only be determined by consensus arrived at 
during community gatherings).  
32. Compurgators, also known as an “oath-helpers,” were persons who would swear to 
the soundness of the litigant’s oath. If a sufficient number of compurgators swore, the 
party won. See F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 12 (A.H. Chaytor & 
W.J. Whittaker eds., 1979) (1910). Some scholars trace the English jury to this custom. See 
Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 Minn. L. 
Rev. 573, 615 (2008) (“When jury trials first began, jurors served as compurgators—indi-
viduals who were selected to sit as jurors because they knew the defendant and could, as 
witnesses, offer opinions regarding the defendant’s credibility and law-abiding nature.”). 
Others disagree. See William Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 69–70 (London, John W. 
Parker and Son 1852) (arguing that compurgators were distinct from juries). 
33. See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1353 (“[T]he initial English practice was to deter-
mine custom through the consultation of local witnesses—especially as organized into 
juries.”); see also Lysander Spooner, An Essay on the Trial by Jury 25 (Da Capo Press 
1971) (1852) (discussing Magna Carta as recognizing that juries had authority to deter-
mine justice of law); cf. Hogue, supra note 22, at 187–88 (suggesting 1164 compilation of 
Constitutions of Clarendon was comparable to work of special “jury” of experts summoned 
to offer “something like the juror’s verdict” on general customs of realm). 
34. Whitman, supra note 11, at 1360. 
35. See id. at 1329–31, 1352–53 (describing these forces in both England and 
continental Europe). 
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These pressures caused custom to split. Treatise writers began to 
speak of two categories of custom: general and particular.36 General cus-
tom was the common law broadly conceived.37 The common law was judi-
cially noticeable. It did not need to be proven; its evidence was in the 
recorded decisions of other judges, which developed into the concept of 
precedent.38 
Custom in the sense of general or higher law became entangled with 
notions of popular sovereignty, reason, natural law, the law of nations, 
and even divine revelation.39 Henry St. John Bolingbroke, for instance, 
called the constitution of England an “Assemblage of Laws, Institutions, 
and Customs, derived from certain fix’d Principles of Reason.”40 The law 
of nations was the product of “‘[c]ertain maxims and customs, conse-
crated by long use, and observed by nations in their mutual intercourse 
with each other.’”41 According to commentators, these customs were 
simply natural law as applied to nations.42 The law of nations in this sense 
was part of the general common law of England.43 As such, the law of na-
tions, like general custom, was judicially noticeable. It could form the 
                                                 
36. E.g., 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *67; Christopher St. Germain, Doctor 
and Student 17, 34 (William Muchall ed., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1886) (1518). 
Blackstone also identified an additional type of particular custom: that associated with the 
civil and canon law and operative only in particular courts or jurisdictions. 1 Blackstone, 
supra, at *79. 
37. See Edward Jenks, English Civil Law, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1916) (noting “‘cus-
tom of the realm,’” referred to in Blackstone, “is the result of the efforts of the King’s 
judges, mainly in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, to build up, out of the varying 
customs of the different parts of England[,]” a body of law for unified commonwealth 
(quoting 1 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *69)). 
38. See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1357, 1360–61 (discussing switch from local wit-
ness testimony about custom to judicial reliance on other judges’ statements about what 
custom is). 
39. See Peter Goodrich, Satirical Legal Studies: From the Legists to the Lizard, 103 
Mich. L. Rev. 397, 481 (2004) (citing fifteenth-century writer Fortescue’s proposition that 
“[t]he ultimate source of reason . . . was custom and practice so immemorial as to be part 
of the law of nature” and concluding “even custom was attributed to a divine rather than 
human inspiration”); Mark D. Walters, The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return 
of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law, 51 U. Toronto L.J. 91, 108 (2001) (noting con-
nection in Fortescue, who found common law to be “a divine, rational, ancient, and per-
fect embodiment of the ius naturale”); Whitman, supra note 11, at 1361 (discussing way in 
which these concepts were blended). 
40. Henry St. John Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties 108 (3d ed. London, H. 
Haines 1735). 
41. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 Vand. L. 
Rev. 819, 823 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, at 
lvi (J. Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T & J.W. Johnson 1863)).  
42. Id. at 822.  
43. Id. at 824 (quoting 4 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *66–*67); see also id. at 822 
(“In the eighteenth century a consensus existed that the law of nations rested in large 
measure on natural law.”).  
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basis of adjudication, outside or even in contravention of the affirmative 
pronouncements of legislatures.44  
Legal writers also associated general custom with popular will or 
consent; Blackstone explained that “one of the characteristic marks of 
English liberty [is] that our common law depends upon custom . . . 
probably . . . introduced by the voluntary consent of the people.”45 The 
common customs of England were those institutions “according to which 
the Community hath agreed to be governed.”46 By the time the Framers 
began to hammer out the original Constitution, they were working with a 
legacy in which these terms: custom, common law, natural law, reason, 
and popular will had lost whatever precision they once might have had.47  
Custom in this sense of general, judicially noticeable, extratextual 
law helped to legitimate slavery in the United States. Before there was a 
law of slavery, there was a custom of slavery.48 A May 1652 enactment by 
the “Commissioners of Providence and Warwicke” attempted to regulate 
the “common course practised amongst English men to buy negers, to 
that end they may have them for service or slaves forever.”49 It failed in its 
declared goal.50 A 1767 bill in Massachusetts aimed “to prevent the un-
                                                 
44. See generally, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (using public law 
and public international law to decide whether Oregon could compel California citizen to 
defend himself in Oregon’s courts); Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.) 652; 
8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a (suggesting that common law could void an act of Parliament, 
“when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason”); Jonathan F. Mitchell, 
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2011) (arguing that 
Bonham “suggested that established common-law customs could trump a later-enacted act 
of Parliament”).  
45. 1 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *75.  
46. Bolingbroke, supra note 40, at 108.  
47. See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1365 (observing that eighteenth-century legal 
scholars “faced a tradition that mixed terminology about ‘reason’ and ‘custom,’ none of 
which had clear meaning”); see also Stoner, supra note 24, at 49 (discussing how Framers 
wrote Constitution in “idiom of the common law” which saw natural rights as complemen-
tary).  
48. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 46 (3d ed. 2005) (“Clearly, 
there was a kind of custom of enslaving blacks, before law explicitly recognized the status 
of the slave.”); Alexander Johnston, Slavery (in U.S. History), in 3 Cyclopædia of Political 
Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States 725 (John J. 
Lalor ed., New York, Charles E. Merrill & Co. 1890) (“[N]egro slavery in the colonies 
never existed or was originally established by law, but that it rested wholly on custom.”).  
49. 1 John Russell Bartlett, Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations in New England 243 (Providence, A. Crawford Greene & Brother 1856). 
50. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North 
America, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1711, 1746 (1996) [hereinafter Wiecek, Origins] (noting 
failure of this statute). 
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natural and unwarrantable custom of enslaving mankind.”51 It too 
failed.52  
To the Arkansas Supreme Court, slavery was congenital to the 
American republic: “[Slavery] was entailed upon our nation at her birth; 
it grew up as she grew; . . . it was regulated and sustained by State stat-
utes, but not so created; it was sanctioned by the people, and by their 
common consent it was made law.”53 To the Connecticut Supreme Court, 
it was an infection: “[Slavery] probably crept in silently, until it became 
sanctioned, by custom or usage.”54  
Both courts and slaveholders recognized that slavery had to have a 
pedigree. To find otherwise would confirm the abolitionists’ charge that 
slavery was nothing more than despotism,55 a betrayal of everything the 
Founders had said they stood for.56 Custom provided that pedigree. 
Judges and legal scholars used the vocabulary of custom to acknowledge 
slavery as part of a long—and, if not venerable, at least tolerable—tradi-
tion.  
Justice Marshall, like many others, traced slavery’s origin to the law 
of conquest: “Slavery . . . has its origin in force; but as the world has 
agreed that it is a legitimate result of force, the state of things which is 
thus produced by general consent, cannot be pronounced unlawful.”57 
Other sources spoke of the customary rights of Christians to dominate 
“heathen” or “infidels.”58 Courts and apologists also referred to slavery as 
                                                 
51. Robert Walsh, An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain Respecting the 
United States of America 312 (1819) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
52. Id. 
53. Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 636 (1869) (holding Federal Constitution’s 
Contracts Clause prevented state constitutional provision abrogating contract for slaves). 
54. Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 42 (1837).  
55. See Richard Hildreth, Despotism in America: An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Results of the Slave-Holding System in the United States 8 (Boston, Whipple and Damrell 
1840) (“[B]ut whether one or a thousand [slaves], of those he does own, the laws create 
him . . . the absolute master, lord and despot.”).  
56. For a discussion of the antislavery rhetoric surrounding American independence, 
see A. Leon Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process 
371–76 (1978). 
57. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825); see also Tindal v. Hudson, 2 
Del. (2 Harr.) 441, 441 (Del. Super. Ct. 1838) (“The origin of slavery will always be traced 
to conquest . . . .”). Compare with the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
rights to real property in America and its relationship to conquest in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823) (“Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the con-
queror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, 
respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.”).  
58. See, e.g., Fable v. Brown, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 378, 391–92 (1835) (“I think 
that the true state of the slave must be ascertained by reference to the disabilities of an 
alien enemy, in which light the heathen were anciently regarded.”); Anonymous, Personal 
Slavery Established by the Suffrages of Custom and Right Reason 11 (Philadelphia, John 
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part of the customary law of nations.59 St. George Tucker (an advocate of 
gradualist abolition) and James Kent analogized slavery to the aban-
doned English practice of serfdom, known as villenage,60 although this 
analogy did not persuade all jurists.61 Writers also cited slavery in Mosaic 
tradition or in ancient Greek and Roman republics.62 This was an an-
guish of parentage: American jurists used these sources “to show that 
slavery bore a lineage that included the noble ancient republics and per-
haps even England itself.”63  
On the eve of the American Civil War, Thomas Cobb wrote an entire 
treatise defending slavery as grounded in custom and natural law. He 
began his work with a sweeping assertion: “[N]o organized government 
has been so barbarous as not to introduce [slavery] amongst its customs. 
It has been more universal than marriage, and more permanent than 
liberty.”64 Cobb went on to exhaustively categorize the African people, 
and concluded that enslavement of black Africans “develops and per-
fects” their nature, and hence could not be contrary to natural law.65  
Judicial acquiescence of slavery as unwritten custom occurred over 
many years, and was far from uniform, but its influence on constitutional 
thinking is reflected in two well-known Supreme Court cases: Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania66 and Scott v. Sandford.67 In Prigg, Justice Story observed that 
property owners retained a common law right to retrieve property 
                                                                                                                 
Dunlap 1773) (arguing “liberty of enslaving the Africans and the Heathen round about 
us” comes from Mosaic law). 
59. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 120–21 (referring to law of nations for legiti-
macy of slavery); Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 568–69 (1851) (tracing slavery to “law of na-
tions”); Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 505 (1869) (finding public history shows slavery 
was “sanctioned and protected by all of the enlightened commercial nations of Europe”).  
60. Ellen Holmes Pearson, Remaking Custom: Law and Identity in the Early 
American Republic 116–18 (2011) (citing 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 
250 (New York, O. Halsted 1827); St. George Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia 
(c. 1790), in St. George Tucker, Ten Notebooks of Law Lectures, bk. 9, at 18) (comment-
ing on these analogies). 
61. See Fable, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) at 390 (“The status, the entire civil and political 
condition of the villein, was, in almost every particular, different from that of our slave.”); 
Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678, 684–86 (1827) (discussing distinctions 
between slavery and villenage). 
62. See Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 685 (looking to laws of ancient Jews, Greeks, and 
Romans for sources of American slave law). 
63. Pearson, supra note 60, at 121 (stating that writers used these sources to “deflect” 
rather than “absolve” themselves of guilt).  
64. 1 Thomas R.R. Cobb, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery, at xxxv 
(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858). For a discussion of the ways writers used 
natural law to support or condemn slavery, see Parker, supra note 22, at 182–87. 
65. Cobb, supra note 64, at 51.  
66. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
67. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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wrongfully taken.68 This common law right of “recaption” was reflected in 
the Fugitive Slave Clause: “The owner must . . . have the right to seize 
and repossess the slave, which the local laws of his own state . . . confer 
on him as property.”69 The “right of seizure and recaption” according to 
Justice Story, “is no more than a mere affirmance of the principles of the 
common law applicable to [slave property].”70 To Story, the Fugitive 
Slave Clause was an expression of a common law right directed towards 
slave property, and could not be frustrated by “the consequence of any 
state law or regulation” to the contrary.71 The result of this decision was 
that, to the extent any one state gave an individual a property right in a 
person, all states had to recognize that individual’s right to seize the per-
son.72 Persons could be seized by private force because the Constitution 
guaranteed certain customary remedies for reclamation of slave property 
that were no different from immemorial customs for reclamation of any 
other type of property.73  
In Scott, Chief Justice Taney referred to the “public history of every 
European nation” to show that any emancipation since the Founding 
resulted from mere positive enactment, and not from “any change of 
opinion in relation to this race.”74 Taney elaborated: “No one of that race 
had ever migrated to the United States voluntarily; all of them had been 
brought here as articles of merchandise.”75 Even those emancipated 
“were identified in the public mind with the race to which they belonged, 
and regarded as a part of the slave population rather than the free.”76 As 
Kunal Parker has written, Taney’s inscription of African slavery in the 
custom and practices of the Founders, and thus the unspoken assump-
                                                 
68. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 613; see Black’s Law Dictionary 1382 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining “recaption” as “[p]eaceful retaking, without legal process, of one’s own property 
that has been wrongfully taken”). 
69. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 613. There is much disagreement about Prigg, its hold-
ing, and its place in the jurisprudence of slavery and freedom. For an unpacking of the 
Prigg opinions, see generally Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 Rutgers 
L.J. 605 (1993) [hereinafter Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg]. For an account that suggests 
Prigg is less proslavery than it has been described, see Leslie Friedman Goldstein, A 
“Triumph of Freedom” After All?: Prigg v. Pennsylvania Re-Examined, 29 Law & Hist. Rev. 
763 (2011). 
70. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 613 (citing 3 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *4). 
71. Id. at 612. 
72. See Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg, supra note 69, at 636 (arguing that Story’s 
opinion “nationalized” slavery). 
73. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Fidelity Through History and to It: An Impossible 
Dream?, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1663, 1674–75 (1997) (noting Fugitive Slave Clause “ex-
panded . . . and elevated [recaption] into a new constitutional right that authorized slave-
holders to pursue and recover their slave property even when their slaves escaped to a 
state that did not recognize slavery”). See also Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg, supra note 
69, at 636 (coming to similar conclusion). 
74. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 412 (1857). 
75. Id. at 411. 
76. Id. 
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tions of the Constitution, enabled slavery’s apologists to write that slavery, 
not freedom, was “‘originally universal, founded upon immemorial cus-
tom and universal principles of international law.’”77 To them, slavery was 
the norm, freedom the aberration.78  
As Professors Pearson and Parker have noted, custom thus provided 
a sense of continuity with the past that Americans needed to accept slav-
ery.79 It appealed to the sense that, despite its odiousness, slavery re-
flected the national, and indeed international, consensus. This does not 
mean that all Americans or all states recognized slavery as fundamental 
law. Instead, at a minimum, slavery represented a privilege of certain 
states and localities, reflected in the federal structure of government and 
its traditions, but only implicit in the constitutional text.80 Such a custom 
could not be eradicated through judicial fiat.81 As numerous antebellum 
courts concluded, slavery might be immoral, but it was not illegal; and it 
was not illegal, because it was customary.82 
B. Custom as Particular Law  
Custom also operates on a particular level. Blackstone identified this 
type of custom as the customary practices of specific localities or trades. 
These customs, unlike the general customs of England, initially resem-
bled jury issues. The very existence of a particular custom had to be proven 
to “a jury of twelve men, and not [to] the judges,” unless the custom had 
been proven and recorded previously in the same court.83 In this sense, 
                                                 
77. Parker, supra note 22, at 186 (quoting George S. Sawyer, Southern Institutes 143 
(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1858)). 
78. See John Craig Hammond, Slavery, Freedom, and Expansion in the Early 
American West 172 (2007) (calling “slaveholders’ vision” one where “slavery was . . . the 
national norm, freedom the exception”); Parker, supra note 22, at 186 (describing argu-
ment that “freedom was the exception to the underlying universal law of slavery”). 
79. Parker, supra note 22, at 185 (stating that for proslavery thinkers “[s]lavery de-
rived its legitimacy precisely from custom”); Pearson, supra note 60, at 114 (remarking on 
American legists’ use of Blackstone to both condemn and justify existence of slavery in 
America).  
80. Dinesh D’Souza summarized the position this way: “[The American Founders] 
produce[d] a Constitution in which the concept of slavery [was] tolerated, in deference to 
[popular] consent, but nowhere given any moral approval, in recognition of the slave’s 
natural rights.” Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society 
109 (1995). 
81. Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 171, 183 n.64 
(1992) (“It is well-established that neither the Supreme Court nor most state courts used 
principles of natural justice to abolish slavery.”). 
82. Id. Compare with England’s Somerset decision, which was cited for the proposition 
that slavery could arise only from positive law. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 
499 (K.B.) 510; Lofft. 1, 17–18 (opinion of Lord Mansfield, C.J.). But see William M. 
Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American 
World, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 86, 105–09 (1974) [hereinafter Wiecek, Somerset] (discussing 
some ambiguities of decision that make it less than ringing endorsement for abolition).  
83. 1 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *76. 
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these particular customs were democratic and parochial. They repre-
sented the normative sense, not of an entire people, but of a segment of 
a polity.   
Particular customs, however, had to clear a second hurdle of judicial 
scrutiny. According to Blackstone, courts could ignore particular customs 
if they did not meet a set of essential criteria: The customs had to be im-
memorial, continuous, peaceable (that is, acquiesced to), reasonable, 
certain, compulsory, and consistent.84 If they failed these requirements, 
they had no legal effect.  
The “reasonableness” requirement for particular customs allowed 
English judges to ignore the custom when it deviated from legislative en-
actments or the general common law, when the local custom’s “effect was 
‘to the general prejudice, for the advantage of any particular person’”85 
or “where the effects of a custom fell unevenly on a class of people.”86 
Further, local or particular customs—even if proven to exist—had to be 
“construed strictly” if the particular custom stood “in derogation of the 
common law.”87  
Besides these Blackstonian traditions, particular custom also resolves 
gaps or ambiguities in interpreting contracts, legislation, or property en-
titlements.88 It forms baselines—for example, whether an easement is a 
taking of private property for a public purpose, or whether the easement 
is, and always has been, public property.89 
Slavery’s defenders used particular custom both normatively and 
pragmatically. First, they used the concept of particular custom to legiti-
mize the institution of slavery against contrary theories of law. Courts oc-
casionally acknowledged that slavery did not meet the strict Blackstonian 
requirements of “good custom” because slavery was not immemorial, or 
because it was against right reason or natural law, or because it conflicted 
with the general common law of England.90 But many other provisions of 
                                                 
84. Id. at *76–*78. 
85. David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and 
Judicial Takings, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1375, 1394 (1996) (quoting Le Case de Tanistry, 
(1608) 80 Eng. Rep. 516 (K.B.) 524; Dav. 28b, 36 (unofficial translation from Law 
French)). 
86. Id. at 1394–95 (citing Haspurt v. Willis, (1670) 86 Eng. Rep. 50 (K.B.); 1 Vent. 71; 
Barker v. Cocker, (1621) 80 Eng. Rep. 471 (K.B.); Hob. 329). 
87. 1 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *78. 
88. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 234 (rev. ed. 1969) (“[C]ustomary law . . . 
plays an important, though usually silent role, not only in the interpretation of written law, 
but in helping to supply the gaps that will always be perceived in any body of enacted 
law.”). 
89. See Bederman, supra note 85, at 1438–44 (gathering cases and discussing this 
phenomenon in context of property disputes); Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom 
in Property, 10 Theoretical Inquiries L. 5, 36–41 (2009) (discussing role of custom in es-
tablishing baselines in regulatory takings jurisprudence).  
90. See Wiecek, Somerset, supra note 82, 118–27 (discussing tensions between custom, 
English common law, natural law, and existence of slavery in England and America).  
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American law also failed these requirements.91 So, despite slavery’s tense 
relationship with Blackstone’s schema,92 courts routinely considered slav-
ery to be legal.  
For instance, a Delaware court in 1791, deciding an unrelated prop-
erty matter, used slavery as an example of a lawful institution that defied 
strict Blackstonian conventions of “immemoriality,” stating, “[s]o there is 
no law for slavery in this state, yet it is legal.”93 Similarly, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court speculated that if slavery rested “entirely upon custom or 
usage,” it was possible that such a custom was “so utterly repugnant to the 
great principles of liberty, justice and natural right” as to be unreasona-
ble and void.94 But as slavery had been regulated by the legislature, it had 
received some “implied sanction,” and therefore could not be judicially 
abolished (although legislative intervention was another matter).95 Other 
courts identified slavery as originating not in the general common law of 
England or from statute only, but as a particular custom of the colonies.96  
Custom also helped maintain the institution of slavery on a more 
granular level. Customary practice helped to generate the legal, social, 
and civil disabilities of the enslaved, from prohibitions on marriage to 
the inabilities to acquire property, possess weapons, or testify in court.97 
Custom also formed the basis for more exotic disabilities, such as special 
punishments for assaulting whites. It also provided a basis to extend 
these disabilities beyond slaves to all African Americans. Sometimes this 
granular custom hardened into specific legislation, sometimes legislation 
responded to custom that was too permissive, sometimes custom estab-
lished baselines for social management, and sometimes custom supplied 
                                                 
91. David Bederman identifies a Virginia court which opined that no local or particu-
lar custom could develop in the state “‘because it lacks the essential ingredient of good 
custom—it is not immemorial.’” Bederman, supra note 85, at 1400 (quoting Harris v. 
Carson, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 632, 638–39 (1836)).  
92. Blackstone himself appears to have reconsidered the relationship between slavery 
and the common law, softening the strong abolitionist language of his first edition of the 
Commentaries. See Wiecek, Somerset, supra note 82, at 98–99 (discussing Blackstone’s 
modification of his initial position). 
93. Wright’s Lessee v. Cannon, 1 Del. Cas. 227, 228 (1796) (citation omitted) (citing 
Pirate v. Dalby, 1 Dall. 167, 169 (Pa. 1786)). 
94. Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 42 (1837). 
95. Id.; see also Wiecek, Somerset, supra note 82, at 123 (discussing the Bulloch deci-
sion). 
96. See Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 506 (1869) (stating slavery was established 
by “local law only” and was “entirely distinct in its origin and authority, and in its territorial 
and personal extent from the common law” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation 
omitted)); see also Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 336 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9583) 
(suggesting that Southern customs had made slavery legal, notwithstanding lack of express 
legislative authorization, and contrary English common law traditions).  
97. Jonathan A. Bush, Free to Enslave: The Foundations of Colonial American Slave 
Law, 5 Yale J.L. & Human. 417, 426 (1993) (noting that slave norms “occurred outside 
legal forms” including “private rule-making” by slave owners).  
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gap-filling norms where the existing common law or legislation was un-
clear.98 
Slave law developed, as Professor Palmer notes, through an iterative 
process among slaves, owners, courts, and legislators, with custom essen-
tial “both to [the] origins of slavery itself and to the continuing develop-
ment of its substantive rules and institutions.”99 Slavery as an institution 
was patched together from scraps of customary practice, common law 
analogs, and positive enactments. Custom helped American slave socie-
ties resolve the core paradox of treating human beings as both persons 
and property.100 Specific regulations differed in their details, but shared 
common ideological and instrumental features: white supremacy, racial 
(and in particular black) subordination, the social and economic de-
pendency of slaves, political powerlessness, and the perpetuation and 
protection of a racial caste system.101  
The doctrine of partus sequitur ventrem represents one example. Who 
could be a slave when one parent was free? Partus sequitur ventrem speci-
fied that status passed from the mother, rather than the father, as it did 
in English villenage. The courts looked to local custom to justify this rule. 
In the 1786 case of Pirate v. Dalby, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
confronted a person who claimed to be free. There, the court observed 
that “[s]lavery is of a very ancient origin. By the sacred books of Liviticus 
[sic] and Deuteronomy, it appears to have existed in the first ages of the 
world; and we know it was established among the Greeks, the Romans, 
and the Germans.”102 The court acknowledged that English practice was 
to trace villenage through father, but because “contrary practice [partus 
sequitur ventrem] has . . . been universal in America; and our practice is so 
strongly authorized by the civil law, from which this sort of domestic slav-
ery is derived, and is in itself so consistent with the precepts of nature, 
that we must now consider it as the law of the land.”103 
                                                 
98. See infra text accompanying notes 100–130 (discussing use of custom by courts 
and legislatures in context of slavery).  
99. Palmer, supra note 23, at 177–78. 
100. Rutherglen, Custom and Usage, supra note 2, at 938 (noting this paradox as 
challenge to coherent slave law); see also Bush, supra note 97, at 420 (“In the end, colo-
nists awkwardly and often implicitly fitted the issues raised by their slaveholding into the 
traditional categories of the common law.”).  
101. See, e.g., Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death 95–96 (1982) (identifying 
degradation and dependence as features of Southern slave society). 
102. Pirate v. Dalby, 1 Dall. 167, 168 (Pa. 1786). 
103. Id. at 169 (emphasis added); accord United States v. Sanders, 27 F. Cas. 950, 951 
(C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,220) (identifying doctrine as common law borrowing from 
civil law); Wilks’s Adm’r v. Greer, 14 Ala. 437, 444–46 (1848) (identifying doctrine as 
common law custom); Wiecek, Origins, supra note 50, at 1756 (discussing emergence of 
this civil law “legal exotic” into America’s otherwise common law system). 
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Legislatures codified some customs into statutes.104 Partus sequitur 
ventrem is an obvious example,105 but other, less obvious customs also 
came to be legislated. A writer observed in 1827 that the prohibition of 
both slaves and blacks in general from testifying as witnesses against 
whites “derive[d] its authority from custom” in some slave states.106 In the 
North, this prohibition was, according to one decision, “a settled point at 
common law[;] . . . a slave could not be a witness” because the authority 
of the master over him was equivalent to duress.107 The Fundamental Law 
of North Carolina specified that “[e]very freeman of Carolina shall have 
absolute power and authority over negro slaves of what opinion and reli-
gion soever.”108 North Carolina enacted this law, not because it was novel, 
but because “it fitted in with what was in the other colonies already good 
custom.”109  
Other times, legislatures regulated or inhibited customs. Baptism of 
slaves, for example, put Anglo-American slave owners in a bind. Because 
slavery depended in part on the justification that heathens could be held 
in thrall, once the enslaved became Christian, it jeopardized a customary 
justification for the new believer’s continued subjugation. Courts and 
legislatures remedied this quandary by positive declarations. In England, 
two senior legal officials resolved the question against enslaved Christians 
over after-dinner drinks.110 In colonial America, legislative bodies de-
cided the question. The Maryland General Assembly, for example, de-
clared that “no Negroe or Negroes by receiving the holy Sacrament of 
Baptism is hereby manumitted or set free nor hath any right or title to 
freedom or Manumission more then [sic] he or they had before any Law 
                                                 
104. See Palmer, supra note 23, at 179 (“When legislators incorporated a custom into 
positive law, they both dignified and recognized it and highlighted the interplay of statute 
and custom.”). 
105. See La. Civ. Code Art. 183 (1824), reprinted in Documentary History of Slavery 
in North America 177 (Willie Lee Rose ed., 1976) (codifying that slave status follows 
mother); An Act Relating to Servents [sic] and Slaves (1715), reprinted in Archives of 
Maryland, Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland, April, 1715–August, 
1716, at 289 (William Hand Browne ed., 1910) (providing that children of slaves would be 
slaves for their natural lives). 
106. George M. Stroud, A Sketch of the Laws Relating to Slavery in the Several States 
of the United States of America 66 (1827). 
107. Respublica v. Mulatto Bob, 4 U.S. 145, 145 n.1 (1795). 
108. The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, Drawn Up by John Locke, March 1, 
1669, reprinted in 1 Colonial Records of North Carolina 187, 204 (W.L. Saunders ed., 
1886); see also John Spencer Bassett, Slavery and Servitude in the Colony of North 
Carolina 27 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press 1896); Friedman, supra note 48, at 48.  
109. Bassett, supra note 108, at 27; see also Friedman, supra note 48, at 48 (discussing 
customary roots of slave law and citing Bassett).  
110. See Wiecek, Somerset, supra note 82, at 93 (discussing how Attorney General and 
Solicitor General of England decided baptism had no effect on slave status in “refectory in 
Lincoln’s Inn” in 1729). 
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usage or Custome to the Contrary Notwithstanding.”111 Other colonies 
issued similar pronouncements.112  
Hence, customs and common law principles that had operated with-
out respect to African chattel slavery had to accommodate that institu-
tion, and became tainted by it.113 Mark Tushnet notes that North 
Carolina judges, for example, had to modify the rules respecting provo-
cation to deal with confrontations between slaves and free persons. “At 
common law,” Tushnet writes, “the only issue . . . was whether the de-
fendant was justified in his striking.”114 Slavery, however, introduced 
“other variables,” including “the relation between the victim and the de-
fendant[,]” “[h]ow serious was the blow[,]” and whether justification 
should “vary with the relationship or the severity of the provocation.”115 
One court, for instance, appealed to custom in stating that any adjudica-
tion of interracial violence under a provocation theory must recognize 
the “habits” of servility “indispensible to [the slave’s] own well-being” and 
“required by the inveterate usages of our people.”116 
In Mitchell v. Wells, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied a woman 
emancipated in Ohio the right to pursue a bequest in Mississippi.117 
Although in other contexts, the question would have been decided by 
generally applicable inheritance and choice of law principles, slavery 
transformed the case into a “vehicle[] for vitriolic denunciation and po-
litical retaliation.”118 To determine whether an emancipated woman 
could claim a bequest, the court asked itself a set of rhetorical questions 
about custom and habits in determining public policy.  
                                                 
111. An Act Relating to Servents and Slaves, supra note 105, at 289 (emphasis 
added). 
112. See An Act to Incourage [sic] the Baptizing of Negro, Indian and Mulatto 
Slaves, Oct. 21, 1706, as reprinted in 1 The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 
to the Revolution 597–98 (Albany 1894) (declaring that baptism does not create reason 
for setting a slave free); An Act Declaring That Baptisme Doth Not Exempt Them from 
Bondage (Virginia 1667), as reprinted in Documentary History of Slavery in North 
America, supra note 105, at 19. For more on this point, see Paul Finkelman, The Crime of 
Color, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2063, 2073–77 (1993) (discussing laws governing baptism and slave 
status).  
113. Lawrence G. Sager, Congress’s Authority to Enact the Violence Against Women 
Act: One More Pass at the Missing Argument, 121 Yale L.J. Online 629, 631 (2012) (noting 
that “elasticity” of common law allowed it to “accomodat[e]” slavery). For a discussion of 
the concept of “tainted law” see Michael C. Dorf, Tainted Law, 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2012). 
114. Mark Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810–1860: A Study in the 
Persistence of Legal Autonomy, 10 Law & Soc’y Rev. 119, 138 (1975). 
115. Id. at 139. 
116. Id. at 143 (quoting State v. Jarrott, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 76, 86 (1840)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
117. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (1859). 
118. Note, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 74, 97 
(1971). 
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Is it the subject of legislative declaration alone? To be pre-
scribed by law, as a rule of action, and to be gathered alone 
from positive enactment? Or are we to be guided by the nature 
and character of our institutions; our Constitution and form of 
government; their nature, character, and whole history; the 
manners, customs, and habits of our people . . . as sources of ev-
idence indicating public policy?119 
Using custom as a gap-filling function, the Mississippi court con-
cluded that the common consent of the people of Mississippi, if not of 
the United States, was to forbid the woman from suing on her bequest. 
Ohio had become “forgetful of [its] constitutional obligations to the 
whole race” by conferring citizenship upon “an inferior caste,” a race sit-
uated by “the order of nature” in a position somewhere “between the 
irrational animal and the white man.”120 Citing the choice of law princi-
ple that no state could be forced to accept laws repugnant to its own pub-
lic policy, the court dismissed the suit.121 
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that a general incor-
poration statute would be read to deny free blacks the ability to found a 
church.122 The legislature had passed a law clarifying that the statute 
would not be construed to permit such incorporation out of fear of “as-
semblages of colored persons, free and slave.”123 The court suggested that 
even if Louisiana had passed no specific language on the issue of black incorpora-
tion, the Court would still have read such an exception into the statute.124 
“The African race are strangers to our Constitution,” the majority stated, 
“and are the subjects of special and exceptional legislation.”125 
An exceptional feature of America’s custom of slavery was its ex-
pressly racial dimension.126 Slaves came in all colors in Greece and 
                                                 
119. Wells, 37 Miss. at 251 (emphasis omitted). 
120. Id. at 262–63. 
121. See id. at 264 (“Ohio, by . . . conferring rights of citizenship there, contrary to 
the known policy of Mississippi, can [not] confer freedom on a Mississippi slave . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
122. See African Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of New Orleans, 15 La. Ann. 441 
(1860). 
123. Id. at 442.  
124. See id. at 443 (“Had the question been submitted to this court, in the absence of 
[the Act], whether the Legislature intended to sanction . . . the formation of corporations 
composed entirely of colored persons . . . we would have been bound to rule the nega-
tive.”). 
125. Id. 
126. See Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of 
Colonial Virginia 315 (reissued ed. 2003) (noting linkage between race and slavery as 
Virginia adopted slave economy); Alan Watson, Slave Law in the Americas 128 (1989) 
(noting racism was part of English slave law from beginning and gradually became harsher 
to both enslaved and free blacks “in exactly the same way”). 
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Rome.127 In America, however, the period of color-blind slavery was 
short-lived. By the nineteenth century, only Africans or their descendants 
could be slaves in America.128 This principle served a gap-filling function 
in understanding laws about who could and could not be a slave. A 
Delaware court summarized this characteristic of American slavery: 
[W]e observe one general and pervading feature, that the black is 
the slave to the white man; this feature has always characterized it 
here. The origin of slavery will always be traced to conquest: the 
two races are marked by very striking differences; and, as the 
one has subjected the other, so will it alone hold that race in 
subjection by the strong arm of force. Were the negro race the 
stronger it would subjugate the white; and the master now, 
would in his turn become the slave. Such being the fact, and 
slaves being fully recognized by our law as property, we shall con-
tinue so to consider them until the legislature alters the law.129 
All persons of African descent were thus presumed to be slaves, and in-
teractions with them were conditioned upon this presumption.130  
                                                 
127. See Watson, supra note 126, at 127 (noting lack of race determinate in Roman 
slavery); Wiecek, Origins, supra note 50, at 1727–28 (“The ancients [Egyptians, Greeks, 
Romans] did not equate slave status with race.”).  
128. Paul Finkelman, Introduction: The Centrality of Slavery in American Legal 
Development, in Slavery and the Law 3, 6 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997) [Finkelman, 
Centrality of Slavery] (“Only blacks could be slaves [in the United States]; no one else, 
however great their misfortune could end up enslaved.”); Wiecek, Origins, supra note 50, 
at 1720 (noting that during eighteenth century, “[s]lavery became a condition reserved 
exclusively for Africans and, in dwindling numbers, the indigenous peoples”). A contem-
porary dictionary of American English usage defined a “slave state” as “a State in which 
negro slavery exists.” John Russell Bartlett, Dictionary of Americanisms: A Glossary of Words 
and Phrases Usually Regarded as Peculiar to the United States 605 (4th ed. 1877) (empha-
sis added). For a discussion of the gradual extinction of Indian slavery, see generally 
Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native 
Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1457 (2011).  
129. Tindal v. Hudson, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 441, 441–42 (Super. Ct. 1838); see also Phillis 
v. Lewis, 1 Del. Cas. 417, 418 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1796) (explaining “[s]lavery in this state does 
not extend, nor has it ever been held to extend, to other persons than Negroes and mulat-
toes descended from a female Negro” and “[t]here is no law which recognizes slaves of any 
other description, nor any custom which has allowed others to be held in slavery” and 
freeing slave because her mother was Asian rather than African). 
130. See Mandeville v. Cookenderfer, 16 F. Cas. 580, 582 (C.C.D.C. 1827) (No. 9009) 
(“Every negro is . . . prima facie to be considered as a slave, and the property of somebody; 
and he, who acts in regard to him as if he were a free man, acts at his peril . . . .”); 
Stringfield v. State, 25 Ga. 474, 476 (1858) (“In this State every negro is presumed to be a 
slave and to have an owner . . . .”); State v. Dorsey, 6 Gill 388, 390 (Md. 1848) (“[T]he law 
has gone so far as to presume every negro a slave to some one . . . .”); State v. Heddon, 1 
N.J.L. 377, 381 (1795) (Chetwood, J., dissenting) (stating blacks must prove themselves to 
be free when claimed by another person); see also Finkelman, Centrality of Slavery, supra 
note 128, at 6 (making similar observation). The relationship between this presumption 
and discrimination against even free blacks in the law of common carriers, for example, is 
explored in David S. Bogen, From Racial Discrimination to Separate But Equal: The 
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Custom in the particular sense thus contributed to the maintenance 
of slavery by helping insulate it from challenges of general or higher law, 
by generating regulations concerning the interactions of both slaves and 
free men, and by establishing a set of racially determined norms to re-
solve problems where ordinary principles of the common law or statutory 
construction were unclear.  
C. Custom as Social Norms 
Custom can also mean a social norm, not necessarily recognized by 
the law, but enforceable by third party sanction or by internal behavioral 
controls. This type of custom is as important (some behavioral scientists 
might say more important) than other types of norms in controlling hu-
man behavior. As Richard Epstein has observed, “[i]t is scarcely possible 
to imagine how any of us could organize the daily task of living . . . with-
out extensive—and perhaps unconscious—reliance on myriad cus-
toms.”131 Many, including H.L.A. Hart, are skeptical that this concept of 
custom can be called “law” at all, at least unaided by some rule that rec-
ognizes it as such.132 And yet, this kind of custom exists and, as the legal 
realists explained, custom in this sense can be as coercive as any positive 
law promulgated by government agents.133  
Custom in this sense operates outside the positive declarations of 
governments. Indeed, it may operate despite such declarations. For ex-
ample, economic cartels and guilds, although they violate the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, can maintain cohesion through bonds of “tradition,” 
“pride,” “loyalty,” or through fear of “shunning” punishments imposed 
by other members of the cartel.134 Scholars such as Ellickson and 
McAdams identify customary norms in informal dispute resolution pro-
cedures among landowners, extrajudicial contract enforcement among 
diamond merchants, and the rise and fall of dueling as a Southern cul-
                                                                                                                 
Common Law Impact of the Thirteenth Amendment, 38 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 117, 126 
(2011). Professor Bogen asserts that “[p]rior to the Civil War, African-Americans could be 
refused passage on common carriers in the South on the grounds that the captain feared 
that they might be slaves trying to escape . . .” Id. at 126.   
131. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of 
Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1, 6–7 (1992). 
132. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 9–10, 44 (1961) (distinguishing “mere 
convergent habitual behavior” from law); Smith, supra note 89, at 10–11 (describing 
positivist claims “that law gets its force from a rule of recognition, which leaves little room 
for custom to operate as law on its own”). 
133. See Horwitz, supra note 8, at 140 (noting Oliver Wendell Holmes’s abandon-
ment of idea of custom as “buffer between consent and coercion”).  
134. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 
515, 585–90 (2004) (discussing role of “social norms of mutual trust and cooperation” in 
industry cartels); Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 Ind. L.J. 1, 10 
(1993) (noting weavers’ guild “sought . . . to encourage social cohesiveness among its 
members” to restrict competition). 
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tural phenomenon.135 As David Bederman puts it, custom in this non-
positivist sense is an “idea that communities can make law through the 
practice and usage of their constituents” that can be “as normative and as 
binding as any act of a legislative sovereign or any decision of a common 
law judge.”136  
Informal customs helped to organize and maintain the institution of 
African chattel slavery in America. The majority of Americans were not 
slaveholders. Hence, slavery depended on a set of norms that ensured 
that slaves would remain servile, that free blacks would not cause agita-
tion, and that whites would maintain racial solidarity with the slavehold-
ing class.137 
As Richard McAdams has written, this type of norm explains the per-
sistence of racial discrimination against slaves and other African 
Americans both before and after emancipation.138 Whites and others who 
aspired to join their group could receive the superior status benefits by 
enforcing norms that depressed the status of others and of black people 
in particular.139 Further, the norms that ensured the slave system’s vitality 
tended to insinuate themselves into other types of interactions. Accord-
ing to Ira Berlin, the essential difference between “societies with slaves” 
and “slave societies” is that “[i]n slave societies . . . the master-slave rela-
tionship provide[s] the model for all social relations: husband and wife, 
parent and child, employer and employee, teacher and student.”140 In 
this poisoned atmosphere, no one is immune.141  
Private norms deployed to replicate the slave system appear in the 
immediate post-emancipation period, and they support the notion of an 
institution reliant on informal social custom as well as law. Minnesota 
                                                 
135. See McAdams, Regulation of Norms, supra note 20, at 340–41 (examining litera-
ture that uses norms to explain “variety of positive and normative issues”). 
136. Bederman, supra note 85, at 1375. These types of norms can eventually harden 
into what one might consider positive law. As with international law, norms in this infor-
mal sense can “ripen” or “crystalize” into a binding law. Cf. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 
12, at 211 (discussing this process); Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational 
Activities of International Organizations, 40 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 87, 88 (2008) (dis-
cussing process of “hardening” of norms in international law). 
137. Patterson, supra note 101, at 36 (noting that for slavery to survive, “[t]hose who 
were not directly involved . . . had to come to accept it . . . as the normal order of things”). 
138. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group 
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003, 1060 (1995) (describ-
ing method in which race discrimination produces status). 
139. See id. at 1060 (applying “status-production model” to racial beliefs). 
140. Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North 
America 8 (1998).  
141. Id. (“From the most intimate connections between men and women to the most 
public ones between ruler and ruled, all relationships mimicked those of slavery.”); 
Patterson, supra note 101, at 76 (noting that in South, single “symbolic code” came to 
define “all authority relations—not only . . . between master and slave but, among the mas-
ters between male and female, upper class and working class, parent and child”).  
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Representative Ignatius Donnelly cited “combinations of white masters” 
who conspired to fix labor wages and conditions in order to return for-
mer slaves to thralldom.142 Assistant Adjutant General Edward W. Smith 
recounted how Virginia employers held meetings to create “unjust and 
wrongful combinations . . . for the purpose of depressing the wages of 
the freedman.”143 Smith predicted these employer cartels, set against a 
backdrop of vagrancy laws that criminalized homelessness or joblessness, 
“[would] reduce the freedman to a condition . . . [of] slavery in all but its 
name.”144 
A letter from a Union colonel in Texas spoke of “‘planters [who] 
have held meetings and have agreed not to hire freed people’” without 
“‘written permission from [the freedman’s] former master.’”145 Donnelly 
quoted an unnamed Southerner who observed that “‘[t]he blacks eat, 
sleep, move, live only by the tolerance of the whites, who hate them. . . . 
[T]heir former masters own everything, and will sell them noth-
ing . . . .’”146  
The compulsion for this type of discriminatory behavior need not be 
expressly legal. As Carl Schurz, who investigated the South in the imme-
diate postwar period, summarized: “It requires only a simple understand-
ing among the employers, and the negro is just as much bound to his 
employer ‘for better and for worse’ as he was when slavery existed in the 
old form.”147 To that end, whites with no stake in the slave system other 
than racial supremacy enlisted themselves in restoring the old order. 
Schurz remarked on the “singularly bitter and vindictive feeling” that 
non-slaveholding whites felt toward blacks, since “the negro has ceased to 
be property.”148 In this sense, the immediate postwar planter class, and 
the entire racial caste system, operated with informal norm generation 
                                                 
142. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 589 (1866) (statement of Rep. Ignatius 
Donnelly). 
143. Id. at 908 (statement of Rep. William Lawrence) (quoting Headquarters Dep’t 
of Va., General Orders, No. 4 (1866)); see also id. (reporting prohibition of “[a]ll combi-
nations or agreements which are intended to hinder, or may so operate as to hinder, the 
employment of labor” (quoting Headquarters Dep’t S.C., General Orders, No. 1 (1866))). 
144. Id. (quoting Headquarters Dep’t of Va., General Orders, No. 4 (1866)).  
145. Id. at 941 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull) (quoting letter from De Gress, 
Colonel, Freedmen’s Bureau, to Howard, Major Gen., Freedmen’s Bureau (Dec. 15, 
1865)). 
146. Id. at 589 (statement of Rep. Ignatius Donnelly). 
147. Carl Schurz, Report on the Condition of the South (1865) [hereinafter Schurz, 
Report], reprinted in 1 Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz 
279, 325 (Frederic Bancroft ed., 1913); see also Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 Fordham L. Rev. 
999, 1030 (2008) [hereinafter Miller, White Cartels] (discussing how “private restraints 
often worked in concert with facially neutral law”). 
148. Miller, White Cartels, supra note 147, at 1028 (quoting Schurz, Report, supra 
note 147, at 311) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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and enforcement mechanisms like those seen in modern economic car-
tels.149 
D. An Interim Summary and Analysis 
The customary nature of slavery—embedded in higher law, particu-
lar law, and informal norms—had three effects on American legal cul-
ture: First, it legitimized an institution that many Americans considered 
morally repugnant by linking it with the prestige of the past.150 Second, it 
supplied a set of instrumental rules and gap-fillers, created by the people 
themselves, to deal with questions of how to treat human beings as prop-
erty. Third, custom formed a normative and behavioral taproot that re-
sisted positive enactments designed to dislodge slavery as an institu-
tion.151  
Because slavery and custom became so entangled in American soci-
ety, as Professor Binder put it, “the condemnation of slavery [by the 
Thirteenth Amendment] challenge[s] the legitimacy of the very tradi-
tions and customs” necessary to understand the Amendment itself.152 If 
slavery insinuated itself into all aspects of American society, how does 
one distinguish those customs contaminated by slavery from those left 
untouched? Which customs—whether general, particular, or informal—
were meant to survive intact after abolition?  
While the questions are difficult, a close parsing of the text, struc-
ture, and history of the Thirteenth Amendment, in light of familiar 
common law modes of reasoning, can provide some answers to the diffi-
cult questions surrounding custom—or at least can provide analytical 
structures to arrive at some answers. Blackstone described Parliament’s 
enactments as having one of two effects on the common law: declaratory 
or remedial.153 Declaratory statutes were necessary “where the old custom 
of the kingdom [was] almost fallen into disuse, or become disputable.”154 
Such statutes simply “declare what the common law is and ever hath 
                                                 
149. For more on the connections between economic and race-based cartels, see 
Darrell A.H. Miller, Racial Cartels and the Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 
100 Ky. L.J. 23, 28–34 (2012) (arguing that racial discrimination can be understood as 
cartel behavior from economic, historical, and behavioral perspectives); Daria Roithmayr, 
Racial Cartels, 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 45, 50–65 (2010) (describing mechanisms by which 
race-based cartels “derive significant economic, social, and political benefits” from racial 
exclusion). 
150. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 22 (noting custom provided sense of continuity 
with past that Americans needed to legitimize slavery).  
151. See supra text accompanying notes 131--149 (discussing post-emancipation 
norms designed to preserve slavery’s features). 
152. Guyora Binder, The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 2063, 2066 
(1996). 
153. 1 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *86.  
154. Id. 
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been.”155 Remedial statutes, by contrast, repair “defects” in the common 
law. They do this by either “enlarging” the coverage of a legal norm 
where the common law was “too narrow and circumscribed,” or by “re-
straining” the common law where “it was too lax and luxuriant.”156  
The Thirteenth Amendment reflects a Blackstonian attempt to be 
both declaratory and remedial. Section 1 is declaratory. It empowers 
judges to identify that which is now no longer custom and to enforce that 
norm through common law reasoning. Section 2 is remedial. It empow-
ers Congress to remedy deficiencies created by the courts’ limited institu-
tional capacities to enforce the norm against slavery in this common law 
manner. The following Part explains this construction in more detail.  
II. CUSTOM AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment states that “[n]either slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”157 Section 2 states that 
“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion.”158 It is the first time the word “slavery” appears in the Constitution. 
It is also the first time the text expressly grants Congress the “power to 
enforce” a specific constitutional provision. As this Part explains, the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s textual, structural, and historical features rely 
upon, but also challenge, methodologies that look to custom as an inter-
pretive resource.159 This Essay ultimately agrees with the sentiments of 
Dean Carter and Professor Rutherglen that Section 1 power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment should be construed narrowly; it is judicially en-
forceable only when the challenged conduct exhibits most of the histor-
ically agreed-upon features of slavery or involuntary servitude. Section 2 
power, by comparison, is broad. It permits Congress to target any individ-
ual act or disability, alone or in the aggregate, that can be tied to or 
threatens to recreate a customary aspect of slavery in America.160  
The Thirteenth Amendment cannot be understood through text 
alone. First, the Amendment refers to both “slavery” and “involuntary 
                                                 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at *86–*87. 
157. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.  
158. Id. § 2.  
159. See Binder, supra note 152, at 2067 (arguing that slavery’s use of custom makes 
its use in legal interpretation problematic).  
160. For more on these themes, see Carter, supra note 6, at 1349–55 (arguing that 
both Congress and courts share responsibility for enforcing Thirteenth Amendment 
against badges and incidents of slavery, but that there are prudential and institutional 
reasons why Congress is better suited to do so); Rutherglen, State Action, supra note 4, at 
1399–1403 (describing relationship between Section 1 and Section 2 enforcement power 
as difference between disabilities that “display all the wrongs of slavery” as opposed to just 
a single wrong). 
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servitude.” The two separate terms suggest that the Amendment contem-
plates some prohibition beyond private compelled labor.161 Second, the 
prohibitions of the text are not cabined by reference to state action or 
interstate commerce. In fact, Section 1 is not directed to any entity at all. 
In Nicholas Rosenkranz’s terms, it is an Amendment that appears to have 
neither an “object” nor a “subject.”162 Instead, Section 1 contemplates an 
“end-state.”163 It is teleological. It is a declaration of both what America is 
and what it ever shall be—a nation without slavery. Third, because the 
Amendment has no subject or object, it operates in ways “primary and 
direct” upon individuals,164 and its specific prohibitions and limits must 
be gleaned from other sources.   
Linguistic conventions alone fail to capture the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s meaning. “Slavery,” as that word is commonly used, is at 
once too narrow and too broad. A strict dictionary reading of the word 
“slavery” reduces it to a near-synonym of “involuntary servitude.” In 
Hodges v. United States, the Court used this narrow view to state that slav-
ery was but “bondage” and the “state of entire subjection of one person 
to the will of another.”165 But this dictionary usage does not capture all 
the ways slavery was more than a simple labor system, a conception that 
                                                 
161. Winthrop D. Jordan, The White Man’s Burden: Historical Origins of Racism in 
the United States 36 (1974) (noting, in English colonies, “[s]ervitude, no matter how 
long, brutal, and involuntary, was not the same thing as perpetual slavery”). But see 
United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (concluding 
original meaning of “involuntary servitude” was “something ‘akin to African slavery,’ alt-
hough without some of the latter’s incidents” (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 
(1916))). A further reason for this reading is the textual caveat: “except for punishment 
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” If slavery and involuntary 
servitude meant the same thing, it would suggest that one can be duly convicted and con-
demned to chattel slavery, a conclusion that one writer has called a “legal absurdity.” 
Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 
869, 873 (2012) (conducting textual analysis of Thirteenth Amendment). 
162. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1005, 1009 n.12 (2011) (discussing application of the Thirteenth Amendment to both 
private and public action); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 
62 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1214 n.11 (2010) (acknowledging that Thirteenth Amendment 
could be violated by both private and public actors).  
163. Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. Tol. L. 
Rev. 855, 857 (2007); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (stating 
Thirteenth Amendment is “an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude 
shall not exist in any part of the United States”).  
164. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (recognizing power of Amendment to reach 
badges and incidents). 
165. 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (quoting Webster’s Dictionary definition of “slavery”). 
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contemporary references to the “slave power” acknowledge,166 and that 
the Supreme Court itself recognized in the Civil Rights Cases.167 
At the same time, “slavery” is a word debased by hyperbole. Jack 
Balkin and Sanford Levinson have catalogued how “slavery” was a “well-
established rhetorical convention[] within British thought” going back to 
the seventeenth century.168 In the American colonies, taxation without 
representation was slavery,169 as was going into personal debt.170 In the 
nineteenth century, Southern ideologues suggested that abolition was 
itself a form of slavery.171 In modern times everything from public accom-
modation laws,172 to healthcare reform,173 to Social Security,174 has been 
described as slavery. The term becomes even more unmoored if we con-
sider slavery’s antonyms—freedom or liberty: words of such notorious 
                                                 
166. See, e.g., Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men 88–89 (1970) (discussing 
concept of “slave power” as totalizing slave regime and its political development and de-
ployment in the North); see also Berlin, supra note 140, at 8 (noting totalizing aspect of 
slavery in “slave societies”).  
167. 109 U.S. at 20 (commenting on Thirteenth Amendment’s “reflex character [of] 
establishing and decreeing universal civil and political freedom throughout the United 
States; and . . . cloth[ing] Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for 
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States”). 
168. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 
112 Colum. L. Rev. 1459, 1482 (2012); see also George A. Rutherglen, The Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery and the Power of Congress to Enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, in 
The Promises of Liberty: The History and Contemporary Relevance of the Thirteenth 
Amendment 163, 164–67 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) (describing rhetorical use of slavery 
during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.)  
169. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 168, at 1483 (quoting letter written by John 
Dickinson in 1768).  
170. See 1 Thomas Jefferson, Memoirs, Correspondence, and Private Papers 404 
(Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., London, Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley 1829) 
(describing economic practices of English merchants as ensnaring Virginia planters with 
debt so that “debts had become hereditary from father to son, for many generations, so 
that the planters were a species of property, annexed to certain mercantile houses in 
London”). Oddly enough, until the Thirteenth Amendment, slavery was not slavery—it 
was “importation,” it was “other persons,” it was “service or labour.” See U.S. Const. arts. I, 
IV. 
171. See James M. McPherson, Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American 
Civil War 50 (1996) (compiling examples of allusions to slavery used by politicians and in 
newspapers). 
172. See Jurisdictional Statement and Brief at 55, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 515) (presenting hotel’s argument that require-
ment to serve African Americans in public hotels is tantamount to “legalized thraldom”). 
173. Andy Barr, Ad: Health Care is “Slavery,” Politico (June 29, 2010, 4:28 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/39154.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (reporting Alabama Republican candidate’s description of President Obama’s 
health care reform).  
174. Matt Pitchford, Allen West: Social Security Disability is Modern Slavery, Daily 
Caller (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/07/09/allen-west-social-
security-disability-is-modern-slavery/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting 
remarks of Allen West, U.S. Representative from Florida). 
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imprecision that the Richmond Enquirer once declared, “Freedom is not 
possible without Slavery.”175 Slavery cannot have such a broad sweep of 
meaning to function as law. “Slavery” must be an idiomatic term, shaped 
by the historical and cultural context in which it is used. 
Recognizing both the teleological nature of the Amendment and, 
perhaps, the limits of textualism, the Court has stated that the Thirteenth 
Amendment extends to the “badges,” “incidents,” and “relics” of slav-
ery.176 In the Civil Rights Cases the Court struck down a suite of public ac-
commodation regulations contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Not-
withstanding, Justice Joseph Bradley, writing for the majority, penned 
broad dicta that has buoyed Thirteenth Amendment doctrine (such as it 
is) ever since. The Thirteenth Amendment is “self executing” and by “its 
own unaided force . . . established universal freedom.”177 It authorizes 
legislation that is “necessary and proper” for effectuating its object, in-
cluding legislation “primary and direct” in nature.178 Indeed, nearly a 
century after the Amendment’s ratification, the waning Warren Court 
capitalized on Justice Bradley’s dicta in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., hold-
ing that a single instance of private discrimination in real estate sales is a 
badge or incident of slavery that Congress may legitimately prohibit 
through its Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 power.179 
The Thirteenth Amendment text and its subsequent interpretation 
by the Court recognize that slavery is an institution. Institution is a 
freighted concept. To call something an institution entails a set of nor-
mative conventions—some historical, some legal, some behavioral, some 
collective, and some individualistic.180 As an institution, slavery requires 
reference to meaning outside the text, to the customs that formed and 
maintained this institution, in order to define it.  
                                                 
175. McPherson, supra note 171, at 51 (noting “Orwellian” nature of remark); see 
also Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 173 (1842) (statement of Rep. Henry Wise) 
(“[W]herever black slavery existed, there was found at least an equality among the white 
population; but where it had no place, such equality was never to be found.”).  
176. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441, 443 (1968) (noting Congress’s 
freedom under Thirteenth Amendment to determine badges, incidents, and relics of slav-
ery). 
177. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
178. Id. 
179. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440–43 (highlighting example of private discrimination 
that can be prohibited through Thirteenth Amendment). 
180. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in 
the Global Economy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 973, 1008 (2002) (noting “syntax [of an institu-
tion] aims at capturing the elaborate body of ritual and praxis that surrounded the sys-
tematic exploitation of involuntary labor in America”); see also Frederick Schauer, 
Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1747, 1752 (2007) 
(observing institutions exist “by virtue of a . . . multifaceted set of rules and relationships” 
and explaining that one’s “considerate or empathetic treatment of another human being 
is an act, but etiquette is an institution”). 
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This is not to suggest that custom as an interpretive resource is un-
problematic. At a basic level, one must decide what customs survived abo-
lition and what customs did not. For example, the Court has held that 
forcing a seaman to perform his service is not involuntary servitude, even 
though the text of the Amendment and the “immemorial” custom of 
mariner service are in tension.181 Similarly, selective service has routinely 
been upheld against Thirteenth Amendment challenges.182 By contrast, 
the Court has stated, in cases like Jones and Runyon v. McCrary, that pri-
vate racial discrimination in housing or private education is a “badge” of 
slavery, tied to the custom of slavery, and that legislation on the issue is 
within congressional Thirteenth Amendment power, despite endemic 
racial discrimination in the North at the time of ratification.183 
One can pose an endless set of rhetorical questions about slavery’s 
legacy in American laws, rights, and institutions.184 Is it possible, for in-
stance, to construct modern doctrines pertaining to the right to bear 
arms without reference to the fact that slaves were denied arms at one 
point in history? Is it possible to understand the militia clauses without 
acknowledging that the militias that were formed to protect the freed 
populace were sometimes the very organizations that oppressed them? 
Can public policing or vagrancy laws be understood without acknowledg-
ing the custom of private slave patrols or the private enforcement of va-
grancy statutes?185 Can the right of association be disentangled from a 
history in which that right was used to keep slaves and their descendants 
from the levers of political power186 and educational opportunity?187 Or, 
                                                 
181. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (“[E]ven if the contract of a 
seaman could be considered within the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not, 
within its spirit, a case of involuntary servitude.”).  
182. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1967) (affirming 
constitutionality of selective service). 
183. Compare Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172–76 (1976) (holding Congress 
may prohibit racial discrimination at private school despite freedom of association claims), 
and Jones, 392 U.S. at 412–13 (deciding prohibition on racial discrimination in real estate 
is legitimate exercise of Thirteenth Amendment power), with Jones, 392 U.S. at 473–74 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (identifying instances of public and private discrimination in 
North). 
184. Orlando Patterson, reviewing the works of others, has identified excessive 
honor, militarism, idealization of women, and regional nationalism as essential compo-
nents of Southern slave society. Patterson, supra note 101, at 95. 
185. See Higginbotham, supra note 56, at 171 (noting South Carolina’s eighteenth-
century slave laws obliged whites to whip slaves found abroad without pass and unaccom-
panied by white person); Schurz, Report, supra note 147, at 326 (discussing southern laws 
“investing every white man with the power . . . of a police officer as against every black 
man”); Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 309, 335–36 (1998) (discussing overlap between slave patrols and militias). 
186. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 465–67 (1953) (plurality opinion) (concluding 
private associations connected to political campaign are not insulated from constitutional 
scrutiny). 
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contrarily, from instances when that right was denied to slaves and their 
descendants who could not meet voluntarily as congregations or aboli-
tionist organizations?188 These questions confirm Professor Binder’s 
observation that if all American legal, social, and economic institutions 
were founded upon customs, and if slavery insinuated itself into all 
American customs, then “abolition of the custom of slavery threaten[s] 
the legitimacy of custom itself.”189  
Professor Binder’s essay challenges all who investigate the meaning 
of the Thirteenth Amendment with respect to custom. Nevertheless, cus-
tom as a sociolegal concept can help us understand the Amendment, 
once we accept that slavery is a word shaped and formed by historical 
context. It is an idiom and an institution: more capacious than bondage, 
but more limited than simple coercion.190 Understanding slavery as cus-
tom can clarify the scope and establish limits for what Professors Balkin 
and Levinson call, quite rightly, a “dangerous” Amendment.191  
Custom as a sociolegal concept has two primary effects with respect 
to the Thirteenth Amendment. First, custom cabins the range of private 
or government practices that a court may, on its own, declare a violation 
of the Amendment’s textual prohibitions. That is, “slavery” as used in the 
Thirteenth Amendment is a historically contextualized term and should 
be read fairly narrowly when the question is one of judicial enforcement. 
Slavery implies a set of power dynamics particularly concerning labor be-
tween private parties and primarily, but not exclusively, concerning 
African Americans.192 The concept of custom, in this way, is a limiting 
principle. The Court can take judicial cognizance of a behavior when it 
falls within the center of a consensus view of what slavery actually entails. 
As Professor David Strauss might say, the word “slavery” serves as a “focal 
point” around which agreements on common law judicial enforcement 
may coalesce.193 Accordingly, judicial enforcement must ordinarily reflect 
                                                                                                                 
187. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170 (holding Congress may prohibit discrimination in pri-
vate schooling through Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power). 
188. William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of 
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 533 (1974) 
(commenting on restrictions on abolitionist speech and organization in antebellum pe-
riod).  
189. Binder, supra note 152, at 2067. 
190. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988) (“[N]ot all situations 
in which labor is compelled by physical coercion or force of law violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment.”). 
191. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 168, at 1471. 
192. See, e.g., The Slaugher-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) (“[W]hile negro slav-
ery alone was in the mind of . . . Congress . . . [the Thirteenth Amendment] forbids any 
other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor 
system shall develop [into] slavery . . . this amendment . . . [will] make it void.”). 
193. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
877, 910–16 (1996) (discussing manner in which text can serve as focus of agreement in 
common law constitutional interpretation). 
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a consensus view of what that word “slavery” means, and that consensus is 
likely to be rather narrow. In this sense, Section 1 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment text also performs the Blackstonian function of resolving 
disputes about what the general customs of the nation are. Section 1 
simply “declar[es] . . . the common law . . . .”194 The customs of the peo-
ple and the fundamental law are forever against chattel slavery, and no 
court can appeal to a pre- or extratextual custom to say otherwise.  
But this textual restriction should not apply the same way to con-
gressional power under Section 2. The very fact that the Thirteenth 
Amendment contains an enforcement provision is a structural feature 
that betrays a distrust of the judiciary’s capacity to recognize the myriad 
ways that slavery operated or could operate in the nation by way of cus-
tom. Otherwise, Congress would simply have made the Amendment de-
claratory and permitted state and federal courts to eradicate “slavery” in a 
familiar case-by-case, common law manner.195 Furthermore, Section 2 
diminishes the need for the word “slavery” to serve as a common law-like 
focal point for agreement (and hence, legitimacy), because the text pre-
sumes that representative democracy will supply that agreement and le-
gitimacy.196  
The fact the Amendment includes an enforcement provision is also 
pertinent to the relationship between the Amendment’s declaration of 
freedom and its implementation. It seems to presuppose that Section 1 
will be underenforced and specifies who should step in to fill the gap. In 
the well-known framework of Professor Sager, Section 1 contains more 
normative content than courts have the time or capacity to disentangle in 
adjudication.197 It is up to Congress, through enforcement, to tease out 
the customs of slavery from untainted customs, and for the people, 
through their representatives, to work out the meaning of slavery and 
                                                 
194. 1 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *86. 
195. Cf. McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48, 80 (1870) (Peters, J., dissenting) (suggesting it 
is for states to determine effects of emancipation). An alternative interpretation is that 
Congress would have possessed power to enforce the Amendment, but only by implica-
tion, and only by relying on reasoning in the despised Prigg v. Pennsylvania decision. See 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 Hous. L. 
Rev. 393, 407 (2012) (discussing early version of Thirteenth Amendment that omitted 
separate congressional enforcement provision as unnecessary).  
196. Michael Vorenberg, Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and 
the Thirteenth Amendment 67 (2001) (observing that concepts of freedom and slavery 
were to occur through enforcement of Amendment). 
197. For more on the concept of underenforced constitutional norms, see Lawrence 
G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1219 n.21, 1234–35 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure] (describ-
ing thesis as presuming “that there exist constitutional norms which are not enforced to 
their full conceptual limits . . . and that such underenforced constitutional norms are le-
gally valid to their conceptual limits” and speculating about thesis in light of Thirteenth 
Amendment); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the 
Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410, 433 (1993) (“[I]n the Thirteenth 
Amendment in particular, the underenforcement premise is very near the surface.”).  
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freedom through that remedial process. In this way, Section 2 also per-
forms a second, familiar Blackstonian function: It authorizes a remedy 
where judicial efforts may be “too narrow and circumscribed.”198 The fol-
lowing section explains these points in more detail.   
A. Custom and Judicial Enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment 
The Thirteenth Amendment is a written repudiation of slavery. The 
importance of its being written is hard to overstate. Writing the word 
“slavery” into the Constitution resolved a debate between those who un-
derstood slavery as an evil that the Constitution accepted, but did not 
name, and those who understood slavery to be so profoundly immoral 
that it that could be recognized only when written.199 In effect, it settled 
the dispute between the radical abolitionists who thought the 
Constitution was a “covenant with death,”200 in the words of William 
Lloyd Garrison, and those who believed slavery could be eliminated 
through some subconstitutional effort.201 The Thirteenth Amendment 
settled the matter by invoking the evil only to exorcise it.202  
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment directs the judiciary to no 
longer recognize this institution as having any force in adjudication. For 
those judges who felt constrained by judicial modesty from abolishing 
slavery on bare moral grounds, the Thirteenth Amendment provided a 
textual hook.203 Slavery could no longer be justified as part of a long and 
ancient history because the people, in reifying abolition through the 
Thirteenth Amendment, repudiated what custom had enabled. 
The history of opposition to the Thirteenth Amendment reinforces 
this custom-clarifying interpretation. As Michael Vorenberg has written, 
Thirteenth Amendment opponents balked at the abolition amendment 
because they understood slavery as interwoven into the deepest customs, 
                                                 
198. 1 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *86. It is possible, as stated earlier, that the tex-
tual word “slavery” combined with an enforcement provision actually contemplates that judi-
cial enforcement was going to be “too narrow and circumscribed.” Rutherglen, State 
Action, supra note 4, at 1369 (noting that Thirteenth Amendment has always been 
underenforced rather than overenforced).  
199. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 22, at 181–86 (discussing ideological differences be-
tween Lysander Spooner and George Sawyer as to whether slavery or freedom was univer-
sal).  
200. William Lloyd Garrison famously denounced the Constitution with these words 
from the Book of Isaiah. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 66 (1988). 
201. See Wiecek, Somerset, supra note 82, at 118–19 (discussing various approaches of 
abolitionist thinking with respect to slavery, the Constitution, and custom). 
202. See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of 
Jefferson 6 (2d ed. 2001) (observing slavery appears first in the Thirteenth Amendment, 
and then, only to abolish it). 
203. Cf. Sherry, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 16, at 1158 (1987) (noting Ex 
Post Facto Clause was defended as offering textual hook for otherwise natural law theory). 
2012] REGULATION OF CUSTOM 1843 
 
traditions, and structure of the nation from its founding.204 Opponents of 
the “unconstitutional constitutional amendment” appealed to the 
Founding Fathers’ original intent, inalienable rights to property, and 
federalism to argue that slavery was a superconstitutional norm—an insti-
tution—that even the text of the Constitution could not destroy.205 The 
Amendment’s opponents lost these arguments. 
But they lost more than that. They lost an approach to constitutional 
interpretation that reposes sole authority in the judicial branch to iden-
tify and address the unwritten customs of the people with respect to slav-
ery.206 The Court’s reputation was at its nadir during Reconstruction.207 
By creating a specific enforcement provision, the Thirteenth 
Amendment clarified the postwar view that questions of slavery’s custom-
ary existence and remedial necessity was not a solely judicial matter, but 
one shared with the political branches.208 This must be the case, for, as 
Vorenberg writes, the Thirteenth Amendment “never had a single, fixed 
meaning”; its drafters and ratifiers “had diverse, competing motivations 
as well as disparate notions of freedom.”209 Consequently, the judiciary 
                                                 
204. Vorenberg, supra note 196, at 108 (noting opponents said “the Declaration of 
Independence was intended for whites, not blacks, and that the framers obviously ap-
proved of slavery wholeheartedly”). 
205. Id. at 107–12 (“[O]pponents [of the amendment] were steadfast in their claim 
that, by overthrowing slavery, an institution accepted by the framers, the amendment was 
inherently unconstitutional.”). 
206. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 97 
(2004) (noting “common law practice” at framing was for courts to “create . . . standard 
adjudicatory devices . . . when administering statutes” and discussing in light of constitu-
tional implementation). 
207. In speaking of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, Michael McConnell 
has observed that the Republicans of the Thirty-Ninth Congress could hardly have been 
warm to arguments that the institution that gave the nation Scott v. Sandford still retained 
“primary authority” to construe the Constitution. Michael W. McConnell, Comment, 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 
182 (1997); see also Nelson, supra note 188, at 549–50 (discussing low confidence in Court 
after Civil War).  
208. Michael Les Benedict has concluded that neither the ratifying legislatures nor 
Congress expected courts to be the primary enforcement mechanism for the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Instead “[t]hey expected it to be enforced through the political process,” of 
which the judicial process would simply be a part. See Michael Les Benedict, Constitu-
tional Politics, Constitutional Law, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 Md. L. Rev. 163, 
176 (2011).  
209. Vorenberg, supra note 196, at 237. Consider, for example, the reaction of the 
editors of the Anglo-African to ratification of the Amendment. They wrote, 
[O]ne thing which makes this triumph the richer . . . is the [second] Section of 
the Amendment . . . . This gives to the Congress the power for ever to legislate in 
reference to the rights of the freedmen—power to see that they are not subject 
to impartial and oppressive law—power to protect them in all the rights of free-
men. 
Thanks to God for Victory, Anglo-African, Dec. 23, 1865, available at 
http://research.udmercy.edu/find/special_collections/digital/baa/item.php?record_id=
2547&collectionCode=baa (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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can enforce the Thirteenth Amendment directly, but should do so only 
in those situations where consensus is fairly clear. Where consensus is 
lacking, the political process necessary to enforce the Amendment forms 
that consensus.210  
B. Custom and Congressional Enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, by granting Congress the 
power to enforce its terms, specifically enabled Congress to identify the 
customs that had maintained slavery, and to abolish them. More im-
portantly, it gives Congress the power to abrogate the customs of slavery 
not only at the point they become law as recognized by a judge, but also 
before they have crystallized into a publicly acknowledged norm. In the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress specifically identified “custom” as a 
target of Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. Through this en-
actment, Congress recognized that slavery was more than an “institution 
upheld by positive law.”211 Congress had a host of reports from 
Freedmens’ Bureau agents, from military officials, and from congres-
sional investigators like Carl Schurz that Southern culture was turning to 
other types of extralegal norms to reestablish the slave system.212 As 
Schurz wrote, whites in the South had come to regard “blacks [as] their 
property by natural right.”213 Whites used informal agreements and tradi-
tional community policing to maintain a system in which they could vin-
dicate their “ingrained feeling that the blacks at large belong to the 
whites at large,” and to deal with blacks “just as their profit, caprice or 
passion may dictate.”214 Schurz conjectured that reconstruction required 
not only a legal but a sociological project of changing the “whole organ-
ism of Southern society.”215 The fact that the Reconstruction Congress 
felt compelled to regulate “custom” is evidence that it understood that it 
had the power to accomplish the type of reconstruction that Schurz men-
tioned in his report.216  
                                                 
210. See Vorenberg, supra note 196, at 67 (observing this represented middle course, 
allowing enumeration of rights to occur through enforcement legislation). Professor 
Araiza has articulated an approach that shares some of these same features in an article on 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. See William D. Araiza, New Groups and Old 
Doctrine: Rethinking Congressional Power to Enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 37 Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev. 451, 506, 516, 529, 537 (2010) (discussing role of consensus in evaluating 
constitutionality of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation).  
211. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 37 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
212. See Miller, White Cartels, supra note 147, at 1026–31 (discussing reports). 
213. Schurz, Report, supra note 147, at 319–20 (quoting letter to Schurz from assis-
tant commissioner of Freedman’s Bureau in Mississippi). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 355. 
216. Professor Rutherglen has concluded that Congress used custom as a term of art 
in 1866 to mean something akin to state action. See Rutherglen, Custom and Usage, supra 
note 2, at 941–50. Whether that is true with respect to construing the 1866 Act, this Essay 
contends that Congress clearly understood that its Thirteenth Amendment power ex-
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Twentieth century cases interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment 
accord with this model. Beginning with Jones and continuing through the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the Justices have tended to follow a re-
strained approach to the self-executing nature of Section 1, but to defer 
to Congress when it exercises its Section 2 enforcement power.217 Tradi-
tionally, this deference is couched in the terms of Congress’s ability 
“rationally” to target the “badges,” “incidents,” or “relics” of slavery.218  
There is a growing literature that has attempted to pin down what 
exactly qualifies as a badge, incident, or relic of slavery.219 Some scholars 
take an extremely broad approach, suggesting any form of subordination 
or prejudice qualifies;220 other scholars take a more restrictive approach, 
arguing that only some types of activity can constitute a badge, incident, 
or relic of slavery, or that only some groups of individuals can suffer a 
badge, incident, or relic of slavery.221  
This writer tends to agree with those scholars who seek some histori-
cal markers for what qualifies as a badge, incident, or relic of slavery. 
                                                                                                                 
tended beyond state action, and permitted regulation of privately generated norms far less 
positive and definitive than enactments or even government policy.  
217. Compare City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1981) (deciding 
closing road not violative of Section 1 of Thirteenth Amendment), and Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (holding no Thirteenth Amendment violation when 
city closed public pools rather than desegregate them), with Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 170–73 (1976) (holding that prohibitions on discrimination in private schooling are 
rational application of Section 2 enforcement power), and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 440–43 (1968) (holding that congressional prohibitions on discrimination in 
housing rational application of Section 2 enforcement power). For a discussion of the 
courts’ restrained view of judicial enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment, see Sager, 
Fair Measure, supra note 197, 1219 n.21.  
218. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170; Jones, 392 U.S. at 440–43. 
219. This literature can be plotted along a spectrum of increasingly narrow distinc-
tions. In recent years, Professor Currie has stated that the Thirteenth Amendment has 
nothing to do with civil rights and that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. and its ilk are wrong. See 
David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 383, 396 (2008) (“To 
equate emancipation with freedom and freedom with the enjoyment of civil rights was 
nothing but a play on words.”). Professor McAward has suggested a somewhat broader 
test: that Congress may legislate against badges and incidents of slavery, but only if the 
badge or incident “is sufficiently virulent or prevalent as to threaten the reemergence of 
slavery or involuntary servitude.” Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 561, 624 (2012). And Professor Tsesis has sug-
gested that the badges and incidents rationale applies to many forms of “arbitrary domina-
tion.” Alex Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & The Thirteenth 
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 307, 309 (2004). Other theories fall somewhere along this 
spectrum.  
220. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the 
Thirteenth Amendment 186–89 (1976) (suggesting that any “arbitrary prejudice” based on 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin can fall within Section 2 power, and speculating 
it may extend to other classifications as well). 
221. See Carter, supra note 6, at 1368–79 (proposing that “the badges and incidents 
of slavery be evaluated with specific reference to the damaging effects of the institution of 
slavery itself and the experience of African Americans under that system and thereafter”). 
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Custom, as this Essay has urged, forms the glue that holds these concepts 
together. The badges, incidents, and relics of slavery are manifestations 
of slavery’s structural imprint on the nation’s laws, institutions, and col-
lective American consciousness. Americans recognize something as a 
badge, incident, or relic of slavery because of its similarity to a social or 
legal phenomenon of slavery.222 And, because Congress is the institution 
charged with managing contested disputes over our slave history, 
Congress deserves significant latitude when identifying and attempting to 
regulate a custom related to that legacy.  
C. Custom, Institutional Competence, and Limits 
Yet, the Thirteenth Amendment’s power to prohibit slavery, if read 
broadly, is a frightening grant of authority. The power does not depend 
on even minimal connections with interstate commerce, has no state ac-
tion requirement, and can be enforced in ways “primary and direct” 
upon persons.223 What keeps the government from turning a tool of 
emancipation into a tool of oppression? This is a serious concern. 
Congress rarely asserts its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power, 
perhaps because of the Amendment’s unsteady theoretical foundation, 
or perhaps because it is unnecessary given Congress’s broad commerce 
authority.224 But that could be changing, especially in areas where 
Congress’s commerce power is questionable,225 or where Congress’s 
authority is countered by other constitutional values.226 All questions of 
power raise questions of limits.227  
One approach is simply to read the Thirteenth Amendment as nar-
rowly as possible, as proscribing only compelled personal servitude. 
                                                 
222. See Rutherglen, State Action, supra note 4, at 1393–1400 (noting that badges 
and incidents of slavery referred to unified or disaggregated subjects that were characteris-
tic of slavery). This writer will not expand further on Professor Rutherglen other than to 
note that the concept of a “badge” of slavery connotes a signification to a polity—a con-
cept fully consistent with the idea of custom in this Essay.  
223. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).  
224. See Rutherglen, State Action, supra note 4, at 1369 (noting that Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement and Commerce Clause enforcement of civil rights tend to over-
lap). 
225. See, e.g., Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-84, div. E, § 4702, 123 Stat. 2835, 2836 (2009) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 249) (citing Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments for authority and ne-
cessity of passing hate crimes legislation); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 
(1995) (holding aggregated effects of crime are not sufficient nexus to interstate com-
merce to support congressional action). 
226. See Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act 
of 2011, H.R. 3541, 112th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2011) (proscribing elective abortions where 
motivation is race or sex selection and identifying Section 2 of Thirteenth Amendment as 
authority); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (upholding substantive due pro-
cess right to abortion). 
227. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579–80 (2012) (up-
holding 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
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Congress would then only have power to draft legislation that remedies 
instances of compelled personal service.228 But, as discussed above, this 
saps the word “slavery” of any special institutional or idiomatic meaning, 
renders the Amendment’s enforcement provision nearly superfluous, 
and seems to run counter to the text, history, and structure of the 
Amendment itself.229 Further, even Justice Scalia, who has shown little 
tolerance for prophylactic rules in constitutional law, grants that race is 
somehow different.230  
Another approach is to impose a proportionality and congruence 
test onto Section 2, in the same way that the Court has imposed such a 
requirement on Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power. In 
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that Congress may only 
pass legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that is 
“congruen[t]” and “proportional[]” to a constitutional injury to be “pre-
vented or remedied.”231 But the Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence is 
unsatisfactory. It has led to a bewildering set of outcomes in which legis-
lation designed to remedy age and disability discrimination in state em-
ployment fails congruence and proportionality,232 but legislation de-
signed to remedy sex discrimination in family caregiving or disability dis-
crimination in courthouse access is congruent and proportional.233 It has 
also opened the Court to accusations of imposing its own policy prefer-
ences in the area of constitutional law and failing to accord appropriate 
respect for a coordinate branch of government.234 Mapping the 
                                                 
228. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 560 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat 
§ 5 does not authorize is so-called ‘prophylactic’ measures, prohibiting primary conduct 
that is itself not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
229. Consider Bailey v. Alabama, in which the Court upheld the federal Anti-Peonage 
Act of 1867, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006), as a valid exercise of Thirteenth Amendment en-
forcement power, even though the Act sweeps in by its own terms allegedly “voluntary” 
compelled service in liquidation of a debt. 219 U.S. 219, 241–43 (1911).  
230. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1338–39 (2012) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (suggesting that prophylactic rules with respect to 
race discrimination are valid, perhaps under strong form of stare decisis); Lane, 541 U.S. at 
563–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same). 
231. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).  
232. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding 
federal statute permitting suits for money damages against states for violation of 
Americans with Disabilities Act not valid exercise of Section 5 power); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (reaching similar result with respect to Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act). But cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 n.16 (1996) 
(acknowledging some suits for injunctive relief against state officials for violation of fed-
eral law are permitted under Ex Parte Young fiction). 
233. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34 (holding that Title II of ADA as applied to access to 
courts is congruent and proportional legislation under Section 5); Nev. Dep’t of Human 
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) (upholding family care provision of Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as constitutional exercise of Section 5 Power). But see Coleman, 
132 S. Ct. at 1338 (holding self-care provision of FMLA not congruent and proportional).  
234. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(questioning soundness of proportionality and congruence test); Lane, 541 U.S. at 557--58 
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Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 jurisprudence jot for jot onto Section 
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment has the merit of consistency, but little 
else.   
A third way to address congressional limits is to try to harmonize the 
Court’s concept of congruence and proportionality with a notion of con-
gressional regulation of custom. To accomplish this harmonization, a 
unitary understanding of slavery must be abandoned. Slavery is not uni-
tary; it is a bundle of disabilities, bound together by conventions.235 Or, as 
Andrew Koppelman has put it, slavery is “a pattern of activities, main-
tained through a pattern of ideas and assumptions.”236 This proposition 
suggests that Congress has the power to regulate anything in this pattern 
when there is some colorable analogical relationship to this pattern.237 
The Court frequently engages in a similar process of analogical reason-
ing to determine whether something is a “search” or “seizure,” “speech,” 
or an “arm” when construing the Fourth, First, and Second 
Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power similarly 
enables Congress to engage in this analogical enterprise. Congress is per-
mitted to legislate against modern behaviors that descend from, resem-
ble, or threaten, individually or in the aggregate, one of the historical 
practices, or historical disabilities, of slavery. It can then regulate that 
behavior before it ripens into a custom.238  
Custom, then, does the work that is sometimes understood in 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine as “congruence.” Congruence does not 
mean simply that which the Court has already declared to be a constitu-
tional violation.239 Congruence is a way of showing that the targeted so-
cial phenomenon is analogous to, and therefore congruent to, a custom 
                                                                                                                 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing congruence and proportionality test as “flabby,” invita-
tion to “judicial arbitrariness,” and one designed to “bring [the Court] into constant con-
flict with a coequal branch of Government”).  
235. See Walter Johnson, Resetting the Legal History of Slavery: Divination, Torture, 
Poisoning, Murder, Revolution, Emancipation, and Re-enslavement, 29 Law & Hist. Rev. 
1089, 1093 (2011) (describing slavery as bundle of rights exercised by one person over 
another); see also United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D.N.M. 2011) 
(“‘[S]lavery,’ banned by Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, [is] a system made of 
various component parts.”). 
236. Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
112 Colum. L. Rev. 1917, 1929 (2012). 
237. See Rutherglen, State Action, supra note 4, at 1399–1400 (suggesting that 
distinction between congressional enforcement and judicial enforcement is that congres-
sional enforcement may target practices that display only some of wrongs of slavery, such as 
private racial discrimination in contracting). 
238. See Carter, supra note 6, 1366–69 (articulating model of Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement that takes into account both racial nature of persons injured, 
and relationship between injury and historical custom or practice of slavery).  
239. But see Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1338–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(suggesting in Fourteenth Amendment cases—other than those dealing with race—con-
gressional power to enforce means only power to proscribe what Court has already identi-
fied as constitutional violation). 
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of slavery. The idea is that the Constitution confers upon Congress lati-
tude to demonstrate that a certain societal phenomenon, left un-
addressed, has or may lead to disabilities that replicate the social, eco-
nomic, or political disabilities of African Americans during slavery.240   
Custom also helps to interpret what the Court means by “propor-
tionality.” Proportionality does not mean that the Court is empowered to, 
as Justice Scalia says, grade the homework of Congress.241 That is, propor-
tionality is not an open invitation for the Justices to second-guess 
Congress’s judgment as to the necessity or wisdom of the legislation in 
the abstract. Instead, proportionality means that Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment regulation cannot crowd out other textually indicated or 
deeply held constitutional values.242 In Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the primary constitutional value in tension with congressional en-
forcement is sovereign immunity. In the Thirteenth Amendment con-
text, because the Amendment operates not only on government entities 
but also on private parties, other constitutional values must be consid-
ered—free speech, freedom of religion, and due process. However, be-
cause the Amendment gives Congress the power to regulate the customs 
of slavery—including customs related to education, racial discrimination, 
mob violence, contracting, common carriers and the like—courts should 
accord these enforcement measures more deference than if Congress 
had simply used its more general power to regulate commerce or spend-
ing.243 As the Civil War and the resulting Fourteenth Amendment altered 
the relationship between Congress and the states, so did the Civil War 
and the Thirteenth Amendment alter the relationship of Congress to the 
individual. Notions of rights of association, of property, of purely domes-
tic matters, and of purely private agreements were altered by the 
                                                 
240. See Miller, White Cartels, supra note 147, at 1045 (“Congress can use its 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power to prevent individual and isolated instances 
of racial discrimination . . . [that,] if aggregated over a broad spectrum of persons, would 
have the effect of locking out African Americans from valuable social, economic, or politi-
cal opportunities.”). 
241. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“This grading of Congress’s 
homework is a task we are ill suited to perform and ill advised to undertake.”). 
242. See Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War, 
SCOTUSblog (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/the-june-
surprises-balls-strikes-and-the-fog-of-war/ (“The propriety of the reach [of congressional 
power] has been thought to be a question of whether the claim bumps against an explicit 
or implicit constitutional barrier.”) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This Essay ad-
vocates a different approach from Professor McAward’s approach, which argues that 
Congress’s assessment of “causation” should be presumptively valid unless there is some 
other constitutional value that would temper that presumption. See McAward, supra note 
219, at 626–29 (discussing causation requirement).  
243. Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172–76 (1976) (finding no freedom of 
association defense to congressional legislation integrating private school); Rutherglen, 
State Action, supra note 4, at 1370 (observing that Thirteenth Amendment’s applicability 
to private action allows regulation of what would otherwise be purely “domestic rela-
tions”).  
1850 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1811 
 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery, and the Court has and 
should continue to respect that recalibration.244   
III. IMPLICATIONS 
A Thirteenth Amendment doctrine understood within a broader 
framework of the identification and regulation of custom gives us a bet-
ter appreciation for the Amendment’s jurisgenerative potential, the 
manner in which courts may evaluate novel uses of the Amendment’s 
enforcement power, as well as the Amendment’s place within a larger 
conversation about constitutional methodology. First, a more completely 
theorized Thirteenth Amendment reinforces the constitutional ground-
ing of existing civil rights legislation, especially given the cracks that have 
begun to form in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.245 Second, it offers 
some intellectual grist for new types of legislation that Congress may see 
fit to enact, grist that is largely indiscriminate to policy or party. After all, 
the same Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power that produced the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 
2009246 has propelled the Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Pre-
natal Nondiscrimination Bill.247  
Indeed, an analysis very roughly along the lines of this Essay has 
played out in a recent District of New Mexico case and demonstrates how 
a more fully realized Thirteenth Amendment doctrine might operate. In 
United States v. Beebe,248 a group of white supremacists moved to dismiss a 
federal indictment charging them with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 249, the 
federal hate crimes statute. The defendants allegedly branded a mentally 
disabled Navajo man with a swastika and drew sexually degrading pic-
tures on his skin.249 The defendants argued that the hate crimes statute 
                                                 
244. Pamela Brandwein, Slavery as an Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction 
Congresses, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 315, 324 (2000) (observing that process of defining slav-
ery also defined boundaries between federal and state, public and private). 
245. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–92 (2012) (opin-
ion of Roberts, C.J.) (holding Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s individual 
mandate is not valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power); id. at 2644–50 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (same); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 
20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that public accommodation laws are “encroachment 
on individual liberty” but confirming that they are permissible encroachment under 
Commerce Clause) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258–
59 (1964)), abrogated by Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566.  
246. Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2836 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249) (cit-
ing Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments for authority and necessity of 
passing hate crimes legislation). 
247. H.R. 3541, 112th Cong. (2011) (proscribing elective abortions where motivation 
is race or sex selection and identifying Section 2 of Thirteenth Amendment as authority). 
248. 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (D.N.M. 2011). 
249. Id.  
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exceeded congressional Thirteenth Amendment power.250 The court 
held the Act constitutional.251 
Attempting to “harmonize” Boerne’s congruence and proportionality 
test with Jones’s more deferential, rational basis test, the district court first 
observed that slavery is “a system made up of various component 
parts.”252 Targeting a badge or incident of slavery, according to the court, 
is targeting “in part, the institution of slavery itself.”253 According to the 
court, if Congress’s identification of a badge or incident of slavery is ra-
tional, then only rational basis review of the legislation is warranted. If, 
however, the identification is irrational, something like congruence and 
proportionality is required. The court then looked to see whether 
Congress could have rationally determined that racially motivated vio-
lence was a badge or incident of slavery, and whether the fact that the 
statute facially applied to persons other than African Americans made 
the Act overbroad.254 The court rejected both propositions. First, racially 
motivated violence was “a routine and accepted part of the American 
slave culture.”255 Consequently, Congress’s decision to target racially 
motivated violence “could not possibly [be] irrational . . . . Rather, the 
history indicates that such a conclusion is ineluctable.”256 Second, what-
ever the claim for overbreadth, the legislation fell upon a Navajo man, 
whom history demonstrated was “a member of a class that suffered slav-
ery before the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.”257 Moreover, slav-
ery, according to the court’s dicta, was an institution that did not make 
distinctions among its victims, so it could extend beyond African 
Americans and Navajos. Because Congress rationally identified racially 
motivated violence as a badge or incident of slavery, the court used sim-
ple rational basis review to uphold the Act.258  
The Beebe court certainly made some errors with respect to its analy-
sis. Imposing a color-blindness component on the Thirteenth 
Amendment seems peculiar. As this Essay has tried to show, slavery as an 
American institution was far from color-blind, and some form of race-
consciousness seems part of the very meaning of the word “slavery,” at 
least as it existed in the United States. Further, the “double deference” 
review process the Court created appears somewhat labored, although 
                                                 
250. Id. at 1048 
251. Id. at 1056. 
252. Id. at 1051.  
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 1052--53 (providing historical overview of racially motivated violence in 
institution of slavery).  
255. Id. at 1052.  
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 1055.  
258. Id. at 1055–56 (applying rational basis review per McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316 (1819)). 
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such double deference is not unheard of.259 However Beebe may fare on 
appeal, its approach to the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power 
seems correct insofar as it concluded that slavery must be understood 
within American customary conventions, that slavery is an institution, 
and that some connection between a historical phenomenon of slavery 
and a modern analog is necessary to maintain the Amendment’s integrity 
and its relevance. 
Finally, as a matter of constitutional theory, understanding the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s relationship to custom speaks to various 
schools of constitutional interpretation, in particular, “new originalism,” 
“new textualism,” “new doctrinalism,” and “common law constitutional-
ism.”260 To be clear, this Essay does not purport to, nor can it, offer a 
comprehensive theory synthesizing these various schools. Instead, this 
Essay merely aims to inject a relatively undertheorized, but historically 
pivotal, Amendment, into a broader conversation about the relationship 
between text, institutions, common law, and history in constitutional 
construction. With that disclaimer, for the new originalists,261 
understanding the Thirteenth Amendment as a method of regulating 
custom frees the Amendment from the narrow, older, original expected 
applications approach (which reduces the Amendment to little more 
than a constitutional punctuation mark) and brings it closer to the re-
sources this school has used to construe other amendments, as, for ex-
ample, the protections and scope of the Second Amendment.262 For the 
new textualists,263 this approach agrees that the word “slavery” is more 
open-textured than has heretofore been recognized. And yet, this Essay 
suggests that the word “slavery” in the Thirteenth Amendment—perhaps 
more so than the word “equal” in the Fourteenth, for example—must be 
contextualized by history, and must be understood as an institution 
                                                 
259. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011) (noting double deference 
owed to state courts under ineffective assistance of counsel test and Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act).  
260. This writer uses all these terms guardedly, aware that there is significant 
disagreement both between and among these different schools of constitutional theory, 
and disagreement even as to the boundaries between one school of theory and another.   
261. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Geo. L.J. 713, 
716–36 (2011) (laying out description of new originalism).  
262. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (identifying “longstand-
ing prohibitions” and common law sources as potential limitations on scope of the Second 
Amendment). For more on this, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Historical Tests, (Mostly) 
Unbalanced Rights, and What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 
122 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing role of extratextual history and custom in 
construing unclear text).  
263. See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New 
Textualism, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1523, 1539–55 (2011) (offering one description of new textual-
ism and its use by various scholars).  
2012] REGULATION OF CUSTOM 1853 
 
shaped by that history, to maintain its integrity as law.264 For the new doc-
trinalists,265 understanding the Thirteenth Amendment as operating on 
and through custom speaks to both the manner and the limits by which 
courts and Congress are empowered to create “decision rules” for enforc-
ing a norm that, by its very language and structure, seems to contemplate 
underenforcement. And finally, for the common law constitutionalists,266 
this Essay provides an example of how methods of common law reason-
ing could apply in those areas of the Constitution where the text and 
structure appear to contemplate a role for both the judiciary and 
Congress in constitutional development.  
CONCLUSION 
The process of construing our Constitution is, in the words of Justice 
Harlan, a process of determining “the traditions from which it developed 
as well as the traditions from which it broke.”267 Slavery still haunts the 
dark recesses of America’s legal and cultural institutions.268 It is a spirit 
far more palpable and proximate today than that of George III and the 
Tory Parliament.269  
In construing the Thirteenth Amendment, it is incumbent upon 
courts to recognize that they are no longer the sole determiners of 
America’s traditions with respect to this signal event in American history. 
                                                 
264. See Carter, supra note 6, at 1366 (“Determining whether a particular injury or 
form of contemporary inequality constitutes a badge or incident of slavery requires a dis-
course about the historical facts of chattel slavery.”).  
265. See Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship 
and District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 789, 797 (2008) (identifying and discuss-
ing concept of new doctrinalism and decision rules). 
266. See generally Strauss, supra note 193, at 877–90 (setting out concept of common 
law constitutionalism).  
267. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing 
scope of Due Process Clause).  
268. Consider, for instance, this selection from the abolitionist newspaper, Elevator, 
speaking on the way slave culture influenced northern rules on enfranchisement: “Thus 
we see [in the Northern states] how the influence of slavery has changed the organic law, 
and how the oligarchy of the petty State of South Carolina has ruled and governed—not 
only the other slave States, but those which have been called by way of distinction, free 
States.” Citizenship and Suffrage, Elevator, Dec. 22, 1865, available at 
http://research.udmercy.edu/find/special_collections/digital/baa/item.php?record_id=
726&collectionCode=baa (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
269. One must consider what American popular constitutional discourse would 
sound like if Americans intoned the names Frederick Douglass, William Lloyd Garrison, 
John Bingham, and Charles Sumner with the same reverence as Thomas Jefferson, James 
Madison, Patrick Henry, and George Washington. For discussion of what Akhil Amar has 
called America’s “curiously selective ancestor worship,” see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of 
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 293 (1998); Tom Donnelly, Our Forgotten Founders: 
Reconstruction, Public Education, and Constitutional Heroism, 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 115, 
117 (2010) (discussing treatment of Reconstruction versus Founding Era historical figures 
in popular culture and textbooks). 
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The enforcement provision of Section 2 is a textual command that the 
question of what has been, what is, and what shall be a custom associated 
with our history of slavery is a question shared with Congress.  
Understanding slavery within this well-developed methodology of 
addressing custom is one response to what Ariela Gross has identified as 
the central conservative narrative: that “slavery has no permanent lega-
cies, unless they are cultural legacies, which cannot be remedied by 
law.”270 Slavery has a permanent legacy: It is embedded in our laws and 
our constitution, in our attitudes and our aspirations. Slavery was a cus-
tom in America: Its history, laws, custom, and culture are as much a part 
of the American experiment as the English Declaration of Right, the 
Mayflower Compact, the Boston Massacre, and Paul Revere’s ride. Ac-
cordingly, the impact of the Thirteenth Amendment should be treated as 
no less revolutionary and no less influential to our constitutional under-
standing. 
                                                 
270. Ariela Gross, When Is the Time of Slavery?: The History of Slavery in 
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